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The right of eminent domain, or that of taking private
property for public use, is one inseparably connected with the
sovereignty of the State, superseding all rights of private pro-
perty. Its existence is traceable back for centuries, without
change of fundamental principles. Constitutions have since
prescribed limitations, but the most important of these, that
compensation must be made, has long been recognized as a
moral necessity.2 The provision in the Federal and State
constitutions for just compensation for property taken,"is
merely a limitation upon the use of the power. It is no part
of the power itself, but a condition upon which the power may
be exercised."'3
Like the power of taxation, the right of eminent domain
is dependent on the right of the State to appropriate whatever
property of its subjects it may need for the public welfare; but
there exists this difference: taxation is an exaction of money
or services from individuals as their respective shares of con-
tribution to any public burden; while property taken by right
of eminent domain is so much beyond the individual's share
of the public burden,4 thus rendering compensation a moral
I Mayor etc. of .Pittsburg v. Scott, I Pa., 309, 314; Yost's Report 17 id.,
524, 530; Palairet's Appeal, 67 id., 479, 488; Darlington v. United States, 82
id., 3 82, 386.
2 Mills on Eminent Domain (2d. ed.), Section i-.
3 United States v. yones, 109 U. S., 518.
4 H1amnett v. Philadelihia, 65 Pa., x46, 152, per SHARSWOOD, J.
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obligation irrespective of constitutional provisions. In the
case of taxation there is no obligation to repay, beyond the
proper application of the tax, for the payment of taxes is a
duty imposed equally on all individuals, who have an interest
in the purposes to which they are properly applicable.' But
"the State should not take compulsorily where it is possible
to buy, or infringe private rights unless there is no other
way. Taxation is therefore the preferable mode whenever it
can be successfully employed, and recourse should not be had
the right of eminent domain unless purchasing is impracti-
cable, or would involve a disproportionate cost."2
. The power of eminent domain is also essentially different
from the police power inherent in the government. The
exercise of the latter is generally based on disaster, fault or
inevitable necessity; and compensation is not a condition of
its exercise. That of the former depends on public utility,
and compensation must be made. The exercise of the police
power may reach to the destruction of property, as to prevent
the spread of a conflagration; by virtue of it, a nuisance may
be abated at the expense of him in fault, and the public safety
secured.?
Thie right of eminent domain has its foundation in neces-
sity, of which the sovereignty taking the property is itself the
judge.4 It is possessed by the government of the United
States, and exercisable l y it within the States, but only to the
extent as renders necessary the enjoyment of the powers which
the Federal Constitution confers. In Kohl v. United States,6
STRONG, J., said: "The powers vested by the Constitution in
the general government demand for their exercise the acquisi-
1 People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 Comstock, 49, 424, per RUGGLES, J.;
Sharpiless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa., 147, 168, per BLACK, C. J.; Wash-
inglon Ave., 69 id., 352; Susanna Root's Case, 77 id., 276.
2 1Hare's Am. Const. Law, pp. 333-4; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa.,
146, 155.
3 Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Pa. 8o, 85; per AGNEW, C. J.; .Respublica v. Spar-
hawk, z Dallas, 357, 363; Craig & Blanchard v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399; Sallpetre
Case, 12 Rep. 13.
4 Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. 382, 386; per PAXSON, J.; Kohl v.
United States, 9! U. S. 367, 371; per STRONG, J.
S9' U.S. 367, 371. See also Craig & Blanchard v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399.
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tion of land in all the States. These are needed for forts,
armories and arsenals, for navy yards and lighthouses, for
custom-houses, post-offices, and court-houses, and for other
public uses. If the right to acquire property for such uses
may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of property
holders to sell, or by the action of a state prohibiting a sale to
the Federal government, the constitutional grants of power
may be rendered nugatory, and the government made depend-
ent for its practical existence upon the will of a State, or even
upon that of a private citizen. This cannot be."
But the necessity must be an actual one; it must be for
the welfare of the public-in harmony with a public duty
incumbent on the government to fulfil-and not for private
advantage.' The sovereignty may delegate the right, but not
to another sovereignty; nor can a State take private property
for the benefit of another State or the citizens thereof-it must
take for its own use; if it have no need of the land, it cannot
donate it to the general government, however urgent the
latter's want of it may be. Congress can provide for the con-
demnation of land, within a State, on which to erect buildings
necessary for purposes of the Federal government, but not for
the advantage of citizens of the State, for they have no
higher rights thereto, nor control therein, than the citizens of
any other State in the Union, as all stand on an equality under
the Federal Constitution.' The land acquired within a State
by the United States, through its right of eminent domain,
though used for governmental purposes, is subject to the
State's jurisdiction; and offences against its laws, though com-
mitted by those in the service of the United States, are punish-
able by the State courts.3
But the Commonwealth may delegate its right of eminent
domain to individuals and corporations organized for public
purposes. ' The right is not presumed to exist in the absence
I i Hare's Am. Const. Law, p. 336.
2 Kohlv. United States, qr U. S. 367; Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. 382.
3 Fort Leavenworth RR. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525; 1 Hare's Am. Const.
Law, p. 336.
4 Finney v. Somerville, 8o Pa. 59, 65 ; i Hare's Am. Const. Law, p. 337.
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of express legislature authority;I and corporations invested
therewith cannot, without express legislative authority, lease,
sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of such right.2o It is by
virtue of an Act of Assembly, or its charter, that a railroad
company can mortgage its franchises.
3
THE LIMITATIONS UPON THE EXERCISE OF THE
RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
These are two:
I. The taking must be for a public purpose.
II. Compensation must be made.
I. THE TAKING MUST BE FOR A PUBLIC PURPOSE.
The use must be a public one, and the property taken
must be actually used for a public purpose, or for one benefit-
ing the public, mediately or immediately. All citizens may
not be benefited alike, as the use may necessarily be a local
one-a park, for instance, or a highway may be of advantage
only to those in a particular locality; but the people in general
are nevertheless interested therein, and have equal rights to
the use thereof. While the benefit need not be universal, all
people in similar circumstances must share therein, and not
merely individuals of a certain class. The fact that a citizen
has no children to educate does not make schools any the
less public uses. 4 Without public interest for its basis, the
exercise of the right of eminent domain would amount to con-
fiscation and usurpation. A mere taking is insufficient;
there must be an ultimate-use, and in precise accordance with
1 Phillips v. Dunkirk, Warre and Pittsburg R. R. Co., 78 Pa. 177, x81:
Slormfeltz v. Mfanor Turnpike Co., 13 id 555.
2 Pittsburg & Connellsville R. R. Co. v. Bedford & Bridgeport .R.
R. Co. 32 P. F. Smith, 104; Barker v. Hartman Steel Co., 129 Pa. 551.
3 Commonwealth v. Susquehanna & Delaware River R. R. Co., 122 Pa.,
306; S. C. 22 W. N. C., 413, 415; 24 id. 81 ; Gloninger v. Pittsburgh & Con-
nelLsville R. R?. Co., 27 id. 497, 499; 139 Pa., 13; Fidelity Co.,v. Ifest Penn.
etc., R. R. Co., 338 Pa., 494.
4 Hare's Am. Const. Law, p. 337; Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 85 Pa.
170, 178; per Gordon, J. See Long v. Fuller, 68 id. 170.
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the purposes which justified the taking, and for such only.
Thus a railroad company cannot construct buildings or erect
machinery, not necessarily connected with the use of its fran-
chise, within the limits of its right of way. Being in deroga-
tion of private right, the authority conferred must be strictly
construed, and does not exist without an express grant.'
I. What is a public use?
Toward the accomplishment of results for which govern-
ments are instituted-the protection of the people and the
promotion of the general welfare-the right of eminent
domain is appropriate. The necessary structures required
for the various purposes of the government, including custom-
houses, court houses, post offices, navy yards, fortifications
and other essentials to the security of life and property;
public schools, parks, highways, acqueducts-are all of them
public uses. So are railroads, canals and turnpikes. Land,
(including streets and highways), may be occupied for the
conveyance of water, gas, steam and electricity to the public.
Bodies of water can be taken to supply the people with that
needed element, and land appropriated for the construction
thereon of the necessary reservoirs and acqueducts. Like-
wise, a dam may be constructed to improve the navigation of
a stream for the purposes of irrigation, though the benefit in
the latter instance, as in the case of supplying a grist mill
with water power, is directly confined to but a few, and the
lands of others may be overflowed. 2 In Bennett's Branch
Improvement Company's Appeal, ' an Act incorporating the
appellant for the purpose of improving a stream which was a
public highway, and authorizing the collection of toll, was de-
clared constitutional; the improvement was for the use of the
public as a highway. " THOMPSON, C. J., said: " Individual
inconveniences must yield to the wants of the whole public.
'Lance's Apipieal, 55 Pa., 16, 25.
21 Hare's Am. Const. Law, p. 339, el seq.; In re League Island,
i Brewster, 524; Long v. Fuller, 68 Pa., I70 ; Darlington v. United States,
82 Pa., 382 ; Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S., 367.
365 Pa., 242.
4 See Smedley vs. Erwin, 51 Pa. 445.
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In most of these cases of improved navigation by companies,
or the state, if not all, individuals have always been found who
would claim to be as well off without such improvements as
with them, and yet they are obliged to pass over them with
their property, and pay tolls. There is no reason in this for
impeaching the validity of the law. This results from the
accidency of location, and of this nobody is to blame but the
owner, and he must submit to all legal consequences incident
thereto." This language was approvingly quoted by GREEN,
J. in the recent case of Genesee Fork Improvement Co. v. Ives I
(decided October 5, 189i) which decided that where a corpo-
ration is invested with the right to take possession of a stream
and improve it and charge tolls for lumber floated upon it, its
right to exercise the franchise and collect the tolls allowed by
the Act of incorporation cannot be defeated by objections
which deny the necessity of the franchise or call in question
the degree of perfection in the improvements made by the
company; and the fact that it was possible to float logs on the
natural state of the water is no reason that the company may
not claim the fruits of its franchise.
In Palairet's Appealz the Act of April 15, 1869, for
the extinguishment of irredeemable ground rents was sought
to be sustained as a valid exercise of the right of eminent
domain, on the ground of public policy, which "has always
been to encourage the free transmission of real estate, and to
remove restrictions on alienation." But the Act, though pro-
viding for compensation, was held unconstitutional, as
amounting to a taking of property for private use.
In some instances land may be taken for a private road,
as where a landowner lays out a road upon intervening land
for the purpose of reaching a public highway. But in such cases
the public is said to be benefited because of the advantages a
closer communication affords. 3 Analogous to the case last cited
establishing the constitutionality of the Act of June 13, 1836,
which authorizes the laying out of private roads, are those cases
129 W. N. C. io9, 112.
267 Pa., 479, 488, el seq.
3Pocopson Road, x6 Pa., x5; I Hare's Am. Const. Law, p. 344.
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sustaining the constitutionality of the Lateral Railroad Act
of May 5, 1832, and its various supplements. ' In both
instances the public have an implied right or license to use
the roads for the purposes for which they were intended.2
But it is essential that the private road, or lateral railroad,
connect with some public highway, affording means for the
public to use the road. Thus in W~addell's Appeal, I the
Act of June 13, 1874, providing " for a right of way across
or under the rivers or other streams of this commonwealth,
for the better and more convenient mining of anthracite coal"
was held to amount to an authorization of the taking of
private property for private use, and was declared unconstitu-
tional.4
The meaning of the words "public use" has been recently
(May, I89I.) explained, fully and ably, by THAYER, P. J., of
Common Pleas, No. 4, of Philadelphia, in Tweftit Street Mar-
ket Co. v. Pliiladelphia and Reading Terminal R. R. Co. 5 He
says, and his opinion was adopted as that of the Supreme
Court,-" Now the meaning of these words, 'for public use,'
has been frequently determined in the cases in which the
question of the validity of the grant of the right of eminent
domain has arisen, where it was necessary to decide whether
the purpose for which the property was to be taken was for
' public use.' Clearly the words do not mean that every use
is a public use, from which the public may incidentally and
temporarily derive an advantage or benefit or convenience,
during the pleasure of the owner of the property, and from
which they maybe excluded at the mere caprice of the owner.
If this definition were accepted, any man's property might be
taken upon the shallowest pretence of a public use. The test
whether a use is public or not is whether a public trust is im-
posed upon the property, whether the public has a legal right
1 Harvey vs. Thomas, io Watts 63; Harve, vs. Lloyd, 3 Pa. 331;
Shoenberger vs. Afulhollan. 8 id.. 134; Hays vs. Risher, 32 id. 169; Brown
vs. Corey, 43 id. 495; Keeling vs. Griffin, 56 id. 3o5.
2 Palairel's Apbeal, 67 Pa. 479, 492; per SHARSWOOD, J.
3 84 Pa. go.
4 See Edgewood R. R. Co.'s Appjbeal, 79 Pa. 257, 269.
5 28 W. N. C. 211, 113, 114; 142 Pa. 580, 586.
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to the use, which cannot be gainsaid or denied, or withdrawn
at the pleasure of the owner. A particular enterprise palpably
for private advantage, will not become a public use because of
the theoretical right of the public to use it. The question is,
whether the public have a right to the use. The general pub-
lic must have a definite and fixed use of the property, a use
independent of the will of the private person or corporation
in whom the title is vested-a public use which cannot be
defeated by the private owner, but which is guarded and
controlled by the law. The true criterion by which to judge
of the character of the use is whether the public may enjoy it
by right, or only by possession. The test is not what the
corporation owning the land may choose to do, but vhat,
under the law, it must do, and whether a public trust is
impressed on the land. A franchise for such a public use
cannot be granted away. The question of a public use is not
affected by the agency employed. It is no more of a public
use for being held by a corporation. To constitute a public
use the property must be under the control of the public, or
of public agencies, or the public must have a right to the use."
In the first instance the Legislature decides whether the
use is public. "As a general rule it rests in the wisdom of
the Legislature to determine what is a public use, and also
the necessity of taking the property of an individual for that
purpose."' The Courts, however, will ultimately determine the
question, declaring the Act unconstitutional if the use is
not a public one; but they leave the question of expediency
solely to the legislative discretion.2  The Legislature
controls the mode of taking private property for public use,
subject to the limitations prescribed by the Constitution.3
2. What may be taken ?
It may be safely said that all species of property, corporeal
and incorporeal, may be appropriated by virtue of the right
1 Mayor etc. of Pillsburgh v. Scott, i Pa., 309, 314; per ROGERS, J.;
Smedley v. Erwin, 5x id., 445, 451.
2 Palairel's Appeal, 67 Pa., 479, 488; Darlington v. United States, 82
id. 382, 386; x Hare's Am. Const. Law, pp. 345, 346.
3 Bacler's Appeal, 90 Pa., 207.
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of eminent domain.' As said by SHARSWOOD, J. in Hammett v.
PhiladelPhia,2 "there may be occasions in which money may be
taken by the state in the exercise of its transcendental right of
eminent domain. Such would be the case of a pressing and im-
mediate necessity, as in the event of invasion by a public enemy,
or some great calamity, as famine or pestilence, contributions
could be levied on banks, corporations or individuals. The
obligation of compensation is not immediate. It is required
only that provision should be made for compensation in the
future. Judge RIUGGLES confines the right to exact money by
virtue of the eminent domain, to the case where it is for the
use of the state at large in time of war. I cannot see that
there is any such necessary limitation. The public necessity
which gives rise to it prevents its being restrained by any
limitations as to either subject or occasion."
Like any other species of property, corporate franchises
may be taken by the Commonwealth, or any one to whom the
Commonwealth has delegated its power of eminent domain.
Section 3 of Article XVI of the Constitution of Pennsylvania
provides that, "The exercise of the right of eminent domain
shall never be abridged, or so construed as to prevent the
general assembly from taking the property and franchises of
incorporated companies, and subjecting them to public use, the
same as the property of individuals." In Twelfth Street
Market Co. v. P/iladelphia and Reading Terminal R. R. Co.,'
THAYER, P. J. (whose opinion, on appeal, was adopted as the
opinion of the Supreme Court) says: "It is too well settled
to admit of debate that under the right of eminent domain
not only the lands of a corporation may be taken for such a
public use as a railroad company, but their franchise also. It
would be a mere affectation of industry for me to parade the
many cases decided in Pennsylvania and the other States of
the Union which affirm this proposition, especially in view of
the express words of the Constitution already quoted, which
I City of Reading" v. Allhiouse, 93 Pa., 400; Lycoming Gas & Water Co.
v. Xoyer, 99, id., 615, 61g.
2 65 Pa., 146, 152-3.
3 28 W. N. C. 1i1, I3; 142 Pa. 58o, 585.
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subject all franchises, as well as other property of corporations,
to the exercise of this right."
The taking of corporate franchises in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain is no interference with the inviolabil-
ity of contracts, which are made subject to the paramount right
of eminent domain and must yield to its exercise. The compen-
sation required for its infringement is a recognition of the con-
tract obligation, and no impairment of it. Thus a bridge of a
corporation can be taken for public use and made a free bridge.2
But property already devoted to public use cannot be
taken by eminent domain for other public *uses without ex-
press legislative authority, or by necessary implication. In
Pennsylvania R. R. Company's Appeal,' GORDON, J. said: " It
is true that a franchise is property, and, as such, may be taken
by a coporation having the right of eminent domain; but in
favor of such right there can be no implication unless it arises
from a necessity so absolute that, without it, the grant itself
will be defeated. It must also be a necessity that arises from
the very nature of things, over which the corporation has no
control; it must not be a necessity created by the company
itself for its own convenience or for the sake of economy.'
In Pittsburgh Junction R. R. Company's Appeal,5 PAXSON, J.
says: "The principle is well settled that 'the lands or right
of way occupied by one railroad company for its corporate
purposes cannot be taken as right of way by another railroad
company, except for mere crossings, and then only for cross-
ing purposes, and not for exclusive occupancy.' This rule is
not confined to the track or right of way of the company, but
also to the grounds occupied by all the appliances necessary
I In re Opening of Twenty-second Street, 102 Pa., io8; Philadelphia &
Gray's Ferry, Pass. Rwy. Co.'s Appeal, id., 123.
2 In re Towanda Bridge Co., 91 Pa., 2i6.
3 93 Pa., i5o, I59.
4 See, also, Pillsburgh Junction R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 122 Pa., 51i; Sharon
Rwy. Co.'s Appfeal, id., 533; Groff's Appfleal, 128 id., 621; 29 W. N. C. 138;
Twelflth Street Ofarket Co. v. Philadelphia and Reading Terminal R. R. Co.,
28 W. N. C. i, I,13; 142 Pa. 580, 586; Penn. R. R. Co., v. Phila. Belt Line
R. R. Co., 29 W. N. C. 202.
" 122 Pa, 511, 529, 530.
THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
for the successful operation of the road."' In Tyrone Town-
ship School District's Appeal,' it was decided that school direc-
tors could not take land, used for the care and support of the
poor, on which to erect a school house.
A public street or highway cannot be taken by a corpor-
ation invested with the right of eminent domain without
express legislative authority. The highways in the State are
public franchises-the property of the people at large and not
of a particular district. The legislature, representing the
people in their sovereign capacity, has, therefore, absolute
direction and control over them. A municipality may make
regulations for corporate purposes, for instance, as to grading,
curbing and paving the streets within its limits; but its
authority is subject to that of the State in respect of its more
general and extended uses.3  The authorities are overwhelm-
ing that railroad and other corporations and individuals
invested with the right of eminent domain have no rights in the
public highways except such as are given them expressly, or
by necessary implication, by some Act of Assembly, or con-
ceded by a municipality by virtue of a delegation to it by the
state of the sovereign power over the highways. The
authority of the Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad case has
remained unshaken3
Although, as said by BLACK, C. J., in Commonwealth v.
Erie and N. E. R. R. Co.,' the " conversion of a public street
to purposes for which it was not originally designed, does
operate severely upon a portion of the people, the injury must
1 See, also, Sharon Rwy. Co.'s Appeal, 122 Pa., 533.
2 22W. N. C., 513.
3 Pila. &!" Trenton R. R. Case, 6 Wharton, 25, 44, 45; per GIBSON, C. J.
4 See Wiffliyz v. R. R. Co., 16 Pa. 182; 3rercer v. Pittsburgh, Fort Vayne
and Chicago R. R. Co., 36 id. 99; Danville, Hazellon 6 Wilkesbarre 2?. R.
Co. v. Comnmonwealth, 73 id. 29; Cake v. Phila. c& Erie 2. R. Co., 87 id. 307;
6 W. N. C. 151 ; Penna. R. R. Co's Appeal, 93 Pa. iSo; Penna. R. R. Co's
Appeal, 115 id. 514; Attorney-General v. Lombard & South Streets Passen-
ger Rwy. Co., i W. N. C. 489; Philada. &Y Reading R. R. Co's Appeal, 16 id.
265; City of Philadelphia v. Phila. & Reading R. 2?. Co., 25 id. 320, 323, per
THAYER, P. J; Penna. R. R. Co., v. Phila. BellLine 2?. R. Co. 29 W. N. C.;
Tzelfth St. M'arket Co., v. Pihila. & Reading Terminal Co., 142 Pa. 580.
' 27 Pa. 339, 354-
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be borne for the sake of the far greater good which results to
the public from the cheap, easy and rapid conveyance of
persons and property by railway. The commerce of a nation
must not be stopped or impeded for the convenience of a
neighborhood. But we can say this only in cases where the
authority, has been given by the sovereign power of the State.
That any private individual or incorporated company, not
empowered to do so by an Act of the Legislature, can take
possession of a street and make a railroad upon it without
being guilty of a criminal offence, is a proposition which I am
sure no lawyer would dream of making. The right of a com-
pany, therefore, to build a railroad on the street of a city,
depends, like the lawfulness of all its other acts, upon the
terms of its charter. Of course, when the power is given in
express words, there can be no dispute about it, It may also
be given by implication." And where it is given, the munici-
pal authorities have no right to object or interfere, and their
consent is unnecessary.
The Act of May 29, 1885, invests natural gas companies
with the power of eminent domain (which they did not possess
under the Corporation Act of May 29, 18742), and all powers
and privileges necessary to the convenient and successful
prosecution of their business. A municipality may give or
withhold its consent to the occupation of its highways by such
company, but cannot couple its assent with conditions not
contained in the Act.3  Municipal consent is essential to the
grant- of exclusive privileges to an electric light company
claiming the same under the Act of 1874.'
In Williamsport Pass. Rwy. Company's Appeal,' the
charter of the company, granted in 1863, authorized it to con-
struct a railway on certain streets in the city of Williamsport,
I Borough of i3illvale v. Evergreen.Rwy. Co., 131 Pa. I.
2 Sterling's Appeal, iii Pa. 35 ; Emerson v. Commonwealth, io8 id. iii.
3 Appeal of the City of Pittsburgh, 115 Pa., 4; Carothers v. Phila. Co.,
ix8 id. 468; Penn Gas Coal Co. v. Versailles Fuel Gas Co, x31 id. 522, 532.
4 Electric Lighting Co. v. Underground El. Light & Power Co., i6
W. N. C. 407.
5 120 Pa. i. See Gloninger v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville R. R. Co., 27 W.
N.,C., 497, 500 ; 239 Pa. 13 ; per GREEN, J.
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without the consent of the municipality; and it was held that
the provisions of Article XVII, Section 9, of the Constitution
of 1874, and of the Act of May 23, 1878, requiring local con-
sent to the construction of passenger railways within city,
borough or township limits,' had no effect on the company's
charter, and it could extend its road without obtaining the
consent of the municipal authorities, the constitutional provi-
sions and Act of 1878 not operating to repeal or alter existing
chartered rights.
If a railroad corporation is authorized to construct a
railroad, by a straight line, between two designated points,
that authority implies the right to run upon, along,
or across all the streets or roads which lie in the course
of such line. If the act of incorporation directs a road
to be made between certain termini, and leaves the
selection of the route to the discretion of the company,
the road may be located on an intervening highway if
in the judgment of the directors it be necessary or expe-
dient to do so The Courts will not interfere, unless
the company exceeds the discretion expressly given.3 In
Groa's App eal,4 it was decided, however, that a turnpike
company incorporated under the General Corporation Act of
1874, whose charter specified the termini on points of a pub-
lic road, but said nothing as to the intermediate route, could
not appropriate for its road bed the highway already dedi-
cated to public use. There was held to be no necessity for
so doing, except to save the expense of acquiring a new
route through private property, the charter neither expressly
nor by implication giving the right claimed.'
1 See Larimer d Lincoln Street Ruy. Co., v. Larimer Street Rwy. Co.,
137 Pa. 533-
2 Conznonwealth v. Erie c . E. R..R. Co., 27 Pa., 339, 355; per BLACK,
C.J.
3 Struthers v. Dunkirk, Warren . Pittsburgh Rwy. Co., 87 Pa., 282;
Parke's Appeal, 64 id. 137; N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. V. Young, 33 id. 175 ;
Cleveland & Pittsburgh R. R. Co. v. Spieer, 56 id. 325; Jutle v. Reystone
Bridge Co., 29 W. N. C. 169, decided Jan. 4, 1892.
128 Pa., 62r.
5 See Penna. R. R. Co. v. Pltila. Belt Line R. R. Co., 29 W. N. C.;
Pittsburg)z junc. R. R. Co. v. Allegheny Valley R?. R. Co., id.
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The grant of a right of way implies the right to con-
struct whatever is essential to the operation of a railroad;
for example, switches, turnouts, sidings, and necessary
structures.1 So where the Legislature confers upon a rail-
road corporation the power to construct branches, it may
occupy the public highways as necessary to the exercise of
the right so given; and the selection is discretionary with
the directors of the corporation.' In Western Pennsylvania
R. R. Company's Appeal,3 it was held that where its charter
authorized the construction of a railroad from a city to
another point outside, the company could construct its road
from any point within the city. In Vollmer's Appeal,' it was
decided that a railroad company, possessing the branching
power, could construct a branch line double the length of
its main line, the latter being three miles long. In the
pending litigation of the "Reading Terminal Railroad,"5 it
was argued that the defendant had the right to build the
elevated road, and cross the streets of the city, without
obtaining the city's consent, by virtue of its branching
power, from which, as a consequence, flows the right to cross
any highway in the State; but it was held that since the
Acts of June 9, 1874, (P.. L. 282), and May 31, 1887, (P. L.
275), the consent of the municipality must be obtained.
Where authority is given a railroad company to change
the site of any public highway whenever it deems necessary,
its decision is conclusive, if the power is not abused. The
necessity need not only arise from a longitudinal occupation
I Getz's Appeal, io W. N. C., 453; Slocum's Appeal, 12 id. 84; P Idla., Wilm.
& Balto. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 54 Pa., 103, 107, Cleveland &" Pittsburgh R. R.
Co. v. Speer, 56 id. 325, 335; Black v. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., 58 id.
249, 252.
2 3ayor, etc., of Pittsburgh v. Penna. R. R. Co., 48 Pa., 355; Cleveland
&'Pitsburglz R. R. Co. v. Speer, 56 id. 325; Western Penna. R. R. Co.'s
Appeal, 99 id. i55; McAboy's Appeal, 107 id. 548, 557; Penna. R. R. Co. v.
Duncan, iii id. 352; Penna. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 115 id. 514; Vollmer's
Appeal, id. 166; Penna. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 116 id. 55.
3 99 Pa., 155.
4 115 Pa., 166.
5 City of Philadelphia v. Phila. - Reading R. R. Co., 25 W. N. C., 320;
now pending in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Parke's Appeal, 64 Pa.
137.
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of the highway, but may exist in the case of a crossing of
the same.' The company, however, must reconstruct the
highway within a reasonable time. On failure to do so,
mandamus will lie to compel the reconstruction ;2 the com-
pany may be indicted for nuisance; or the municipality may
reconstruct the road, and recover the cost from the company.
3
If in changing the line of a highway, a railroad company
creates a necessity for a bridge, it is liable not only for the
cost of its construction, but also for such repairs and recon-
struction as the public needs require.' But if authority is
given to cross streets, a railroad company is no trespasser,
and the manner of crossing, resting in the sound discretion
of the company, is not reviewable unless the discretion is
abused
3. What constitutes a taking.
Anything may be said to amount to a taking which de-
prives the owner of the use, occupation or enjoyment of his
property. It may be an entire or partial deprivation. But
physical assumption, entry or occupation is not necessary, nor
any change of condition. Thus where a railroad locates its
route by survey, it is a taking and appropriation of the land,
although the actual construction of the road is not com-
menced for several years afterward: and damages are recov-
erable not alone because of the location but also for the sub-
sequent construction. 6 in re District of the City of Pittsburgffh
it was held that the mere laying out of streets through one's
I Penna. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 128 Pa., 509; Appeal of Townshipi of North
Af7anheim, 22 W. N. C., 149.
2 Pittsburgh, AfcKeesport &" Youghiogheny R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth
ex. rel., Attorney-General, io4 Pa., 583; Buffalo, N. Y. & P. R. R. Co. v.
Commonwealth, 120 id. 537.
3 Pills., Va. & Charleston Rwy. Co., v. Commonwealth, ioi Pa., 192, 197;
Commonwealth v. Penna. R. R. Co., ui7 id. 637.
4 Bean v. Howe, 85 Pa., 26o; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Borough of r-win, id.
336.
5 Appeal of the Borough of South Waverly, 20 W. N. C., 209.
6 Beale v. Penna. R. R. Co., 86 Pa., 509, 511; Pills., Ma. &" Charleston
Rwy. Co. v. Commonwealth, io id. 192; Davis v. Titusville 6-' Oil City
Rwy. Co., ir4 id. 3o8.
72 IV. & S., ,320.
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property was no taking thereof; there must be an actual open-
ing and application to public use. But, under the Act
of 1855, a land-owner can recover compensation, though the
street over his land has not been actually opened and damages
have been assessed by viewers legally appointed.' But later
statutory enactments have changed the law. In Volkinar
Street' it was decided that until an act was done indicating
that the possession of the owner was about to be disturbed, no
right to have damages assessed accrued to him. In Borough
of Easton v. RineR it was held that no damages were sus-
tained until the street was actually opened. In Brower v. City
of Pladelphia4 it was held that the Act of April 28, 1870,
"defining the line of Chestnut Street in the City of Philadel-
phia" did not constitute a present or actual appropriation of
land, and the right of the land-owners to sue for damages
does not accrue until the city actually enters upon the land in
pursuance of the power given by the Act. These cases were
approved in In re Change of Grade of Plan, 166, where MIT-
CHELL, J., held that the placing of a street upon the public plan
is so far an interference with the rights of property that no build-
ings may thereafter be erected within the lines, and those so
erected must be removed at the expense of the owner, and
without damages being paid therefor when the street is
opened; yet no right of action accrues until the actual
opening.
In Monongahela Naa. Co. v. Coons,6 a taking was define
as an " assumption of possession "-and unless there was
an actual taking, and not merely a deprivation of the use of
property-as, for an example, a flooding of it by reason of
the construction of a dam by a lower riparian owner-no
'City ofPhiladefiida v. Dickson, 38 Pa. 247; Samne v. Dyer, 41 id. 463.
2 124 Pa. 320 ; see Wizlaker v. Borough of Phonixville, 28 WV. N. C. 30:
141 Pa. 327.
3 x6 Pa. 7.
428 W. N. C. 87, 142 Pa. 350.
5 28 W. N. C. 4o6, 409.
86 11. & S., 1oi, 114; per GIBSON, C. J.
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damages were recoverable.' Although a lot owner owned -to
the middle of a highway, the location of a railroad thereon
close to the line of his property, thereby lessening its value,
was an injury for which no redress was obtainable, as no part
of his property was actually taken; the public having a right
of way thereon, and the company like use of the public high-
way.' But this was prior to the Constitution of 1874. In
Sharpless v. 2fayor of Pliladelphia,3 it was held that taxation
is not a "taking" of pr6perty within the intendment of the
Constitution. In Monougahela Bridge Co. v. P. & -B. Rwy.
Co.' the use of a private bridge by a railroad company, in
accordance with an Act of Assembly, was held not to be such
a taking under Article XVI, Section 8, of the present Consti-
tution as to enable the bridge company to an appeal from the
-decree of the quarter sessions fixing tolls.
II. COMPENSATION MUST BE MADE.
The second requisite to the exercise of the right of emi-
nent domain is that compensation must be made. This is an
incident of the right, of long standing, and not in any way
dependent on constitutional provisions, which merely give
additional security. In his treatment of the subject, Puffen-
dorf wrote: "It will be confessed agreeable to natural
equity, that when contributions are to be made for the
preservation of some particular thing, by persons that enjoy
it in common, every man should pay his quota, and one
should not be forced to bear more of the burthen than an-
other. And the same holds to be equity also in Common-
wealths; but because the state of a Commonwealth may
often be such that either some pressing necessity will not give
leave, that every particular subject's quota shall be collected,
or else, that the public may be forced to want the use of some-
thing in the possession of some private subject; it must be
allowed that the sovereign power may seize upon it, to answer
'JrfeKean v. Delaware Division Canal Co., 49 Pa., 424; West Branch &"
Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Mulliner, 68 id. 357.
2Snyder v. Penna. R. R. Co. 55 Pa., 34o.
3 21 Pa., 147, 166-7, per BLACK, J.
'x4 Pa., 478.
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the necessities of the State. But then all above the propor-
tion that was due from the proprietors, is to be refunded to
them by the rest of the subjects." I
The Federal aild State Constitutions have adopted the
principle of Magna Charta that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.2
These are the words of the Fifth Amendment, which also
provides: "Nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." The Fourteenth Amend-
ment-an additional guarantee to the citizen-provides : "Nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." The Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania of 1874, declares: " Nor shall private property be taken
or applied to public use without authority of law, and with-
out just compensation being first made or secured."3  "Nor
can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property unless by
the judgment of his peers or the law of the land."4
In Fetter v. Wilt,' it is said: "'Judgment of his peers'
is a term or expression borrowed from 'Magna C/zarta,' and
it means a trial per pais, or by the country, which is a trial
by jury. The words, 'or of the law of the land,' have the
same origin, and are to the same effect, as 'due process of
law,' in the bill of rights in the Constitution of the United
States, and it means judgment of law in its regular course
of administration through courts ofjustice."6
The Constitution of Pennsylvania, adopted in 1790, con-
tained the clause: "Nor shall any man's property be taken
or applied to public use, without the consent of his repre-
sentatives, and without just compensation being made."'
ILaw of.Nature and Nations, Bk. VIII., ch. 5, Sec. 7-
2 Palairet's Aippeal, 67 Pa., 479, 485-6.
3 Art. i, Sec. To.
4
Art. I., Sec. 9.
546 Pa., 457, 460; per THoMPSON, J.
GSee, also, Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa., 256; Penna. R. R. Co. v. First Ger-
man Lutheran Congregation, 53 id., 445; Craig v. Kline, 6s id., 399, 413;
Rutherford's Case, 72 id., 82; Philadelphia v. Scott, 8i id., 8o, go; Peopile's
Pass. Rwy. Co. v. Marshall St. Rwy. Co., 25 W. N. C., 318, 320.
7 Art. IX., Sec. io.
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Under this section, in azyor, etc., of Pittsburg-h v. Scott,'
it was held that "where private property is taken for public
use, it is not necessary that the compensation should be
actually ascertained and paid before the property is appro-
priated. It is sufficient, if an adequate remedy is provided,
by which the individual can obtain compensation without any
unreasonable delay."' But as said in Yost's Report,3 the
citizen was often deprived of the compensation which the
Constitution secured to him by reason of the insolvency of
the corporations or individuals taking his property by virtue
of the right of eminent domain which they possessed. To
remedy this evil, the Amendment of 1838 was passed, which
provides: "The Legislature shall not invest any corporate
body or individual with the privilege of taking private
property for public use, without requiring such corporation
or individual to make compensation to the owners of said
property, or give adequate security therefor before such
property shall be taken. '
This section requires that corporations or individuals
must "pay or secure the price of the property before it is
taken;" but it was held sufficient if the State in taking property
should provide the means of payment at the passage of an
Act.4 The power of taxation which a State or municipality
possesses is, ordinarily, sufficient security to the citizen whose
property is taken by it; but where it is clearly shown that the
power of taxation is inadequate within a reasonable time to
pay the damages likely to be occasioned, the Court, on proper
application, will prevent the appropriation of the property until
adequate security is provided.'
Article XVI, Section 8, of the Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania, adopted in 1873, contains this provision: "Municipal
I i Pa., 309, 314.
2 Commissioners of Kensinglon v Wood, io Pa., 93, 97 ; 7fcClinlon v.
Pills., Ft. IPayne & Phi. Rwy Co., 66 id., 404, 407.
3 17 Pa., 524, 531.
4Art. VII., Sec. 4.
5 Monongaheld iXav. Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S., 1OI, 114; Yost's Report, 17
Pa., 524, 531 ; McClznton v. Pills., F l. Wayne & Chi. Rwy Co., 66 id. 404, 408.
6 Keene v. Borough of Bristol, 26 Pa., 46, 48; Long v. Fuller, 68 id. 170,
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and other corporations and individuals invested with the
privilege of taking private property for public use, shall make
just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed by
the construction or enlargement of their works, highways or
improvements, which compensation shall be paid or secured
before such taking, injury or destruction."
In the Constitution of 179o and the Constitution of 1838,
provision was made for the recovery of damages by him whose
property was taken by the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, and the Courts refused redress to all whose property
was not actually taken. It did not matter how much was
taken; though it were a small portion, the owner could
recover compensation not only for what was appropriated, but
also damages done to the remainder of the property. A neighbor
might suffer greater injury, but could recover nothing unless
something was taken. The word "taking" was "interpreted
to mean, taking the property altogether; not a consequential
injury to it which is no taking at all. For compensation of
the latter, the citizen must depend on the forecast and justice
of the Legislature."' If the Legislature made a corporation
liable for consequential injuries, it could not evade the respon-
sibility;2 but where charters contained no such provision,
redress was refused in every case.
3
1 Phila. d Trenton R. R. Co.'s Case, 6 Wharton, 25, 46; per GIBSON, C. J.
2 Lycoming Gas & Water Co. v. Moyer, 99 Pa., 615; Finn v. Providence
Gas & Water Co., id. 631.
3 Shrunk v. Schuylkill Nay. Co., 314 S. & R., 71 ; Phila. & Trenton R. R.
Case 6 Wharton, 45; Mronongahelailra v . Co. v. Coons, 6 W & S., 2o; 6 Pa.
379, 382; Henry v. Pitts. & Allegheny Bridge Co., 8 W. & S., 85; Susque-
hanna Canal Co. v. Wright, 9 id. 9; Milin v. R. R. Co., j6 Pa., 182, 193;
O' Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 id. 187; Ceienbaugh v. Chester Valley R. R. Co.,
22 id. ioo; NY. & Erie R. R. Co. v. Young, 3 3 id. x75; Watson v. P. & R.
R. R. Co., 37 Pa., 469, 479; Buckwalter v. Black Rock Bridge Co., 38 id. 282,
286; Clarke v. Birmingham & Pitts. Bridge Co, 41 id. x47; Monongahela
Bridge Co. v. Kirk, 46 id. 12; AfcKeen v. Delaware Division Canal Co., 49
id. 424, 440; Cleveland & Pitls. R. R. Co., v. Spieer, 56 id. 325; Koch v. Wil-
liamsfiort WVater Co., 65 id. 288; Freeland v. Penna R. R. Co., 66 id. 92;
West Br. & Susq. Canal Co. v. Mfiulliner, 68 id. 357, 36o; Bald Eagle Boom
Co. v. Sanderson, 32 P. F. Smith, 402; New Castle & Franklin R. R. Co. v.
McC7iesney, 85 Pa., 522; Struthers v. Dunkirk, Warren & Pills. Rwy Co., 87
id. 282, 285; Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 90 id. 85, 88; Malone v. City of
Philadelihia, 12 W. N. C., 396; Cumberland Valley R. R. Co. v. Rhoadarmer,
107 Pa., 214, 221.
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A reference to a few of these cases will illustrate the
injustice and hardship which citizens suffered.
In Monongahela Nay. Co. v. Coons,' the construction of a
dam caused the flooding of the plaintiff's mill. GIBSON, C. J.
said: "Now, it cannot be said that the plaintiff's mill was
taken or applied, in any legitimate sense, by the State, or by
the company invested with its power; nor can it be said that
he was deprived of it. * * * We have no difficulty in
saying that the State is not bound beyond her will to pay for
property which she has not taken to herself for the public use.
If, then, the State would not be bound to pay for the damage
done to the plaintiff's mill, had she been the immediate cause
of it, how is the defendant bound ? The company acted by
her authority, as well as for the public benefit; and conse-
quently with no greater responsibility than is imposed by the
Constitution, which, it must be admitted, has narrowed the
protection that the delegation of her power would otherwise
have afforded." Accordingly a verdict for plaintiff was set
aside. But, subsequently, the plaintiff recovered, the Legisla-
ture having by a supplementary charter, accepted by the
company, made it liable for consequential damages.
In Henry v. Pittsburgh and Allegheny Bridge Companyj
the plaintiffs sought to recover damages resulting from the
raising of a street twelve feet (above the level of the doors of
plaintiff's houses), to accommodate the street to the use of the
bridge erected by defendants over the Allegheny River; but a
recovery was denied on the authority of Monongahela Navi-
gation Co. v. Coons, "in which it was held that neither the
State nor a person, artificial or natural, acting by its authority
or command, under a law which the Legislature is competent
to make, is answerable for consequential damages occasioned
by the construction of a highway, farther than happens to be
specially provided." * * * "The bridge was
thrown across a navigable stream, from the terminus of one
highway to that of another, without encroaching on the
plaintiffs' soil, or invading their dominion. Not a shovelful
of earth was taken from it, or thrown upon it. There stands
16 W .&S., ioi, 113, 114; 6 Pa., 379.
2 8 W. & S., S5, 86.
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their property, within its proper limits, as it stood before; and
the substance of the thing complained of, would, if done with-
out authority, be a nuisance and the substance of an action on
the case."
O'Connor v. Pittsburgh,1 was a case of greater hardship.
The city cut down the grade of a; certain street greatly to the
damage of a church frontihg thereon, and it was held damages
were not recoverable. GIBSON, C. J., said: "We have had
this cause re-argued in order to discover, if possible, some way
to relieve the plaintiff consistently with law; but I grieve to
say we have discovered none. * * * The consti-
tutional 'provision for the case of private property taken for
public use, extends not to the case of 'property injured or
destroyed; but it follows not that the omission may not be
supplied by ordinary legislation.' No property was taken in
this instance; but the cutting down of the street consequent on
.the reduction of its grade, left the building useless, and the
ground on which it stood'worth no more than the expense of
sinking the surface of it to the common level. The lss to the
congregation is a total one, while the gain to holders of
property in the neighborhood is 'immense. The Legislature
that incorporated the city never dreanit that it was laying the
foundation of such injustice; but, as the charter stands, it is
unavoidable."
In the case of the Philadelphia and Trenton R. R. Com-
pany,2 and those of Cliveland and Pittsburgli R. R. Co. "v.
Speer, 3 and Struthers v. D., W & P. Rwy. Co.,4 abutting
property owners were denied redress for injuries sustained,
consequential upon the operation of a railroad in the highway.
To remedy- these serious evils Article XVI; Section 8, of
the present Constitution was devised, providing that compen-
sation be made for property taken, injured or destroyed, by
corporations in the construction of their works, etc.
The first case which arose thereunder was City-of Reading
v. Althouse,5 a proceeding for the recovery of compehsation
1 18 Pa., 187, i89, 190.
2 6 Wharton, 45.
3 56 Pa., 325.
87 Pa., 282.
5 93 Pa., 400, 404, 406.
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for the diversion of a certain stream, from which, through a
ditch, plaintiff obtained water for purposes of irrigation; and
it was decided that recovery could be had under an Act of
Assembly whose terms protected the plaintiff, and also by
virtue of Article XVI, Section 8, of the Constitution; GORDON,
J., saying: "That section provides for the making of compen-
sation, not only for the taking of private property for public
use, as was the case theretofore, but also for its iinuy or destruc-
tion. That the use which the plaintiff made of the waters of
the great or Antietam Creek, through the race or ditch in
controversy, was property, though of an incorporeal kind, is
not open to debate; and that it was injured by the operation
of the City of Reading, is a fact established by the proper
tribunal. There is, therefo-e, no good reason apparent to us,
why the case should not be covered by the above recited
eighth section of the Constitution."
The next case before the Supreme Court was Borough of
Ncw BrighIzton v. United PFresbyterian Churclt,' in which it was
held that damages resulting from the change of grade of a
street were recoverable by an abutting property owner; and
it was ruled " that a change from the natural grade is a change
of grade just as clearly as if changed from a grade previously
made by the authorities," 2
Pusey v. City of Allegheny3 followed, deciding that a
municipality in opening a street is bound to compensate not
only those whose property may be actually taken, but also
those whose property is injured or destroyed in consequence
of the opening of the street. GORDON, J., said: " Corpora-
tions in whom the Legislature has vested the right of eminent
domain, are, by this section (Section. 8, of Article XVI, of the
Constitution) made liable for damages resulting to private
property, for the construction, use or alteration of their works,
ways or other improvements; in other words to such damages
as are ordinarily called consequential. This being now the
196 Pa., 331.
H endrick's Apbfeal, 2o3 Pa., 358, 361; Borough of jN-e-v Brikhtoh v.
Piersol, 107 id. 280; Landes v. Bor. of V--ristown, 21 W. N. C., 212.
98 Pa., 522, 526.
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supreme law of the land, it must govern the case under
consideration."
Quite recently the Supreme Court of the United States
finally settled a Case of vast importance, brought for the
recovery of damages done to the property of a citizen of
Pennsylvania, by reason of the construction of an elevated
railroad along a public highway, in front of his premises, no
part of the latter being taken. The matter was first brought
into Court in 1879, by the filing of a bill in equity for an
injunction to restrain the construction of the road. An
injunction was refused by Common PleasNo. 2, of Philadel-
phia, in a learned opinion by HARE, P. J., MITCHELL, J:, filing
an opinion concurring in the decree; and, on appeal to the
Supreme Court, the decree was affirmed, per curiam.1 On
June 6, i88 ii the plaintiff brought an action of trespass on the
case for the recovery of the damages he sustained, arising
from the " construction of an abutment and pier in the
Schuylkill River opposite Filbert Street; and from the noise,
burning cinders, smoke, dust and dirt, incident to the opera-
tion and use of the railroad; by deprivation of plaintiff's use
of Filbert Street as a highway, and of four hundred feet of
building front on said street; and by deprivation of free access
to the wharves on the Schuylkill front of his property." A
verdict of $2o,ooo was rendered in plaintiff's favor, and on
writ of error by the defendant, its chief contention was that it
could not be bound by Article XVI, Section 8, of the Consti-
tution because by the law, as it was previous to the adoption
of this Constitutional provision, it was not liable for such
injuries; and such liability could not be imposed upon it,
even for its own subsequent act, without a violation of its
rights under the law as it was. But this contention was not
sustained, and it was held that under the pre-existing law the
defendant's rights were in no sense the result of a legislative
grant of power to inflict the injury without liability, and the
provision of the Constitution referred to took away none of
the chartered rights of the defendant. The defendant, there-
1 Duncan v. Penna. R. R. Co., 7 W. N. C., 551; Duncan's Appeal, 94 Pa.,
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fore, was bound by the Constitution of 1874,1 and the decision
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States on
November i I, 1889, and the verdict for the plaintiff sustained.
A similar case was that of Philadelphia and Reading Rail-
road Co. v. Patent,3 where the plaintiff recovered damages
resulting from the shifting and relocation of defendant's track
on the street in front of his property, depriving him of the use
of the highway.
These two cases therefore establish that corporations
chartered before the adoption of the Constitution of 1874,
are liable for "consequential" injuries unless exempted by a
charter not subject to constitutional or legislative amendment.
In both cases it must be observed that none of the plaintiff's
property was taken.
In Penna. R. R. Co. v. Lippincott and others and Penna.
R. R. Co. v. Marchant,' the plaintiffs brought suits to recover
for the depreciation of their properties, situated along the
North side of Filbert Street, in consequence of the "noise,
burning cinders, smoke, dirt, dust and jarring, incident to the
operation and use" of the defendant's elevated railroad,
which was constructed on the South side of the street, upon
ground owned by the company in fee, the whole width of the
street (fifty-one feet) intervening. Under instructions, verdicts
were rendered for the plaintiff in each case. The conten-
tion of the company, on writs of error, was based on the
following propositions:
(i). The eighth section of Article XVI of the Constitu-
tion requires compensation to be made to property owners
for only such injuries as would be actionable at common law
if done by a person not invested with the State's right of
eminent domain.
I Penna. R. R. Co. v. Duncan, iii Pa., 352. See the explanation of the
case by GREEN, J., in Gloninger v. Pittsburgh and Connelsville R. R. Co.,
27 W. N. C. 497, 503; 139 Pa. 13.
2 129 Pa., x8z; 132 U. S., 75.
3 17 W. N. C., z98.
4 116 Pa., 472.
1 x19 Pa., 541. See, also, Ryan v. Penna. R. R. Co., 132 Pa. 304; Auman
v. Phila. & Read. R. R. Co., 133 id. 93; Dooner v. Penna. R. R. Co., 242 id.
36; Robb v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., Limited, 28 W. N. C., 339, 345.
THE RIGHT OF EMINENTr DO.M8AIN.
(2). The injuries to the plaintiffs, arising from the con-
struction of the defendant's road on the opposite side of the
street on its own property, are not such injuries as would be
actionable at common law if done by a person, or a corpo-
ration vested with a franchise to operate a steam railroad,
and not vested with the State's right of eminent domain.
The defendant is, therefore, not liable for such injuries.
(3). The Constitution provides only for compensation
arising from the construction of the railroad. There can be
no compensation for injury to person or property (unaccom-
panied with negligence), arising from the 'operation or use
of the railroad, as distinguished from its construction.
In reversing the Lippincott case and those argued with
it, GORDON, J., said : " This structure having been erected on
the defendant's own land, and no property or right of the
plaintiffs having been seized, appropriated, or interfered with,
we cannot understand how a rule which applies only to 'a
taking, and never did apply to anything else, can be adapted
to a case where there has been no such taking. It' is not
pretended that the erection itself did the plaintiffs -any
harm, but its use only-that is, the running of locomotives
on it. * * 'It is a principle well settled by many adjudi-
cated cases that an action does not lie for a reasonable use of
one's right, though it be to the injury of another. For the
lawful use of one's own property a party is not answerable
in damages, unless on proof of negligence.' How then, we
ask, can a lawful erection by the Pennsylvania Railroad Com-
pany on its own ground be the subject of damages to the
adjoining landowners? And why may it not, as put by the
defendant's first point, operate and use in a lawful manner its
Filbert Street branch without subjecting itself to an' action
for damage ? It seems to be very clear that a private person
could do with impunity on his own property just what the
railroad company has done. He might build a house, and
thus shut out his neighbor's view, light and air; he might
build an embankment, or run a road on or along his own line,
and be liable for nothing as long as he used his house,
embankment or road in a lawful manner, although in either
1 1i6 Pa., 481, el seq.
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case an injury may have been done to the adjacent property.
* * In the case in hand the plaintiffs sustained no injury
from the construction of the viaduct; none of their property
was taken, neither was any of their rights infringed, so that
neither by the Constitution nor by the cases quoted,' is there
a warrant for the plaintiffs' contention. We agree that over
and beyond the damages which arise from a taking of
property, whether in the shape of land or a right, the Con-
stitution does impose on corporations a direct responsibility
for every injury for which a natural person would be liable
at common law; so we have held in the case of Edmundson
v. The Railroad Company, iii Pa., 316, and to this doctrine
we adhere, for such we think is the spirit of that instrument,
but beyond this we cannot go. Nor is there any reason why
we should depart from a rule so reasonable and subject
artificial persons to a burden which cannot be imposed upon
natural persons. * * * If this Pennsylvania Company
has been guilty of a nuisance; if in the use of its road it
makes more smoke or dust than is lawfully allowable in the
working of its machinery, and the plaintiffs are thereby
injured, they have their remedy, but not for anything short of
this. Any other rule would lead to this remarkable result,
that the plaintiffs would be entitled to damages without
having suffered any injury; that is, for anticipated damages,
and for which a natural person could not be held liable.
Moreover the corporation would thus be made responsible
for the manner in which it proposed to exercise its right,
though such manner might not only be lawful, but the best
possible, and the least injurious to the property of others."
TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ., dissented.
In the subsequent case of Penna. R. R. Co. v. Marchant, the
decision in the Lippincott case was followed, PAXSON, J., filing
the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court, in which it
was said: "It is very plain to our view that the constitutional
provision was only intended to apply to such injuries as are
1 Pusey v. Cily of Allegheny, 98 Pa., 522; Pillsburgh Junction R. R. Co.'s
Appeal, 18 W. N. C., -27; Penna. R. R Co.'s Apeal, id. 418; Penna. R. R.
Co. v. Duncan, ixi Pa., 352.
2 559, seq.
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capable of being ascertained at the time the works are being
constructed or enlarged, for the reason among others, that it
requires payment to be made therefor, or security to be given
in advance. This is only possible where the injury is the
result of the construction or enlargement. For how can
injuries which flow only from the future operation of the road,
which may never happen, be ascertained in advance, and com-
pensation made therefor.
"It remains to say that if the construction of the Consti-
tution contended for be correct, then we have a liability
imposed upon corporations in the operation of their works
which is not now, and never has been, imposed upori individ-
uals. No principle of law is better settled than that a man has
the right to the lawful use and enjoyment of his own property,
and that if in the enjoyment of such right, without negligence
or malice, an inconvenience or loss occurs to his neighbor, it
is damnum absque injuria. This must be so, or every man would
be at the mercy of his neighbor in the use and enjoyment of
his own. In the late case of the Pennsylvania Coal Company
v. Sanderson, I 13 Pa. 126, it was said by our brother CLARK:
'Every man has the right to the natural use and enjoyment of
his own property, and if, whilst lawfully in such use and enjoy-
ment, without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable
loss occurs to his neighbor, it is damnum absque injuria, for
the rightful use of one's land may cause damage to another
without any legal wrong.'1  * * * * It was not contended
that the injuries of which the plaintiff complains, are in any
degree the result of the negligent or unskillful operation of
the defendant's road. * * * This brings us to the question
whether in case a natural person were the owner of this road,
and were operating it in the manner that the defendant com-
pany are now doing, he would be responsible to the plaintiff
1 See also Collins v. Charliers Valley Gas Co., x31 Pa., 143; Del. & Hud.
Canal Co. v. Goldstein, 125 id. 246; Fulmer v. Williams, 122 id. igi; Price v.
Grantz, ii8 id. 402; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 112 Pa., 34; Lybe's Appeal,
io6 id. 626; Collins v. Chiarliers Valley Gas Co., 27 W. N. C. 217 ; Common-
wealilt v. Miller id. 257 ; Robb v. Carnegie Bros. & Co. Limited, 28 id 339,
345, where Penna. R. R. Co. v. Liippincotl, 116 Pa. 472, Was examined and
distinguished; KUeiser v. Mzahony City Gas Co., 28 W. N. C. 369; Clark v.
Penna. R. R. Co., 29 id. 49.
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in damages. We answer this question in the negative. He
would not be responsible, for the reason above given, viz.:
that he would have a right to the reasonable use and enjoy-
ment of his property, and if, in such use, without negligence
or malice, a loss unavoidably falls upon his neighbor, he is not
liable in damages therefor. * * * The necessities of a
railroad company and the character of its business compel it
to seek the heart of a great city. This is as much for the
convenience of the public as for its own. Hence the transpor-
tation of ptssengers and freight as near to the centre of a town
as possible is in the direct line of its duty, whether that duty
be performed by a corporation or individual. It is a part of
the lawful use and enjoyment of property, and, where it is done
without negligence, entails no legal liability therefor."1
A "consequential" injury, within the intendment of
Article XVI, Section 8, was defined to be "an injury to a
man's property, the natural and necessary result of the con-
struction or enlargement of its works by a corporation; an
injury of such certain character that the damages therefor can
be estimated and paid or secured in advance as provided in
the Constitution." And the word "injury" (or "injured ") as
used in the Constitution means "such a legal wrong as would
be the subject of an action for damages at common law. For
such injures, both corporations and individuals now stand
upon the same plane of responsibility."
In his vigorous dissenting opinion STERRETT, J., says :'
"Such a narrow construction of the section under considera-
tion was never dreamed of by those who took an active part
in moulding it into its present form, as the debates of the
Convention will show, nor was it so understood by the peo-
ple who adopted it; nor is it the construction theretofore
clearly recognized and adopted by this Court in several
cases, some of which have been specially mentioned. The
crowning vice of the construction is in restricting the words
'injured or destroyed' to such injuries as result wholly from
construction alone, and holding there can be no recovery for
injuries resulting from the use of the road for the very pur-
I Robb v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., 28 W. N. C. 339, 345; per WILLIAMS, J.
2 ri9 Pa., 572, et seq.
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poses for which its -construction was authorized by the Legis-
lature. * * * In the case of actual taking, whereby the
company acquires an easement or right of way over the
property appropriated, the purpose for which the servitude is
thus fastened upon the land, the duration and manner of
enjoyment, the injury to remaining land resulting therefrom,
are all taken into consideration. Why should not this be
done also where there is a direct and manifest- injury un-
accompanied by actual taking? It was so held in the cases
of Railroad v. Duncan and Railroad v. McCutcheon, both of
which were cases of injury resulting from. operation of the
respective roads without any taking. It may be asserted
without fear of successful contradiction that in principle they
are both identical with the present and other Filbert Street
cases."
The facts in the case of Fittsburgh Junction R. R. Co. v.
McCutcheon,'1 were these: In the construction of its elevated
road the company took complete possession of a street
building solid stone walls of heavy masonry across its entire
width almost completely cutting off access to the plaintiff's
dwelling houses. The Court refused the following point, pre-
sented by the defendant: " That the plaintiff can recover
damages only for such injuries as would have been actionable
at common law, had the defendant proceeded without legisla-
tive authority, and that damages arising from noise, smoke
and dirt in the passage and re-passage of trains upon the road
are not peculiar and special to the plaintiff, but are in the
nature of common annoyances, for which a right of action at
common law would not lie in favor of an individual, and are
therefore, not to be taken into consideration in estimating
plaintiff's damages in this case." The question was elabor-
ately argued before the Supreme Court, which, in a short per
curiam opinion, said: " Under the new constitution, the
plaintiff was entitled to compensation for all damages direct or
consequential which he suffered or might suffer in conse-
quence of the building and operation of the defendant's road."
And the judgment for plaintiff was affirmed.
1 18 W. N. C., 527.
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In Penna. R. R. Co.'s Appeal' the appellees obtained an
injunction restraining appellant from constructing or main-
taining a railroad track along a highway on which plaintiff's
properties abutted. In affirming the case, TRUNKEY, J., said:
" True, they have not taken the plaintiffs' property, and if the
plaintiffs have not been specially injured they are not entitled
to an injunction. * * But he who has his dwelling fronting
on the street, * * * who is subject to the smoke, noise and
other incidents of railway trains passing near his door, suffers
a special injury. Were the road lawfully constructed, the
only question would be, whether the plaintiff's lots were
worth less by reason of the construction, and if so, how
much."
In County of Chester v. Brower,' the plaintiff recovered
consequential damages caused by the erection of the abut-
ments of a county bridge, fourteen feet above the grade of the
street in front of his house; there was no taking of any of
plaintiff's property It was also decided that a county was a
corporation within the meaning of Article XVI, Section 8, of
the Constitution, and therefore liable for consequential dam-
ages.
Penna. Schuylkill Valley R. R. Co. v. Walsh," was an action
of case brought for the recovery of damages arising from the
construction and operation of defendant's railroad along
a street in front of plaintiff's premises; the allegation was
that by reason of the obstruction of the highway, access to
plaintiff's buildings was cut off and the same rendered diffi-
cult of approach, and the buildings, parsonage, church and
school rendered unfit for use as such, and their value totally
destroyed. In'affirming the judgment entered for plaintiff,
PAXSON, C. J., said: " In Railroad Company v. Lippincott and
Railroad Company v. Marchant, as in this case, there was no
1 'iS Pa., 514, 529.
2 117 Pa., 647.
3See, also, on the question of change of grade: .Kershaw v. City of Phila-
delphia, 27 W. N. C. 341 ; Chambers v. Borough of South Chester, 28 id. 249;
i40 Pa. 5io; It re Plan, 166, 28 W. N. C. 4o6; Ogden v. City of Philadelphia,
id. 413.
' 124 Pa., 544, 559.
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actual taking of any portion of the plaintiff's property, but
there the analogy ceases. In the cases cited there was no
injury by reason of the construction of the road; here there
was an injury and a serious one, the direct result of the con-
struction. The track was laid close to the curbstone on the
side of the street next to the plaintiff's property, by means of
which the access thereto if not actually cut off, was rendered
dangerous. In this respect the case is upon all fours with
Railroad Company v. Duncan, I II Pa., 352 and County of
C/hesterv.Brower, 117, id. 647. It was urged, however * * *
that the injury was solely the result of the use and operation
of the road. This is plausible but unsound. Where the
question is the obstruction of access to a property by the
building of a railroad, it is impossible to separate the con-
struction from the operation of the road. Such a doctrine
would be a misapplication of the rule laid down in Railroad
Company v. Marchant. It would be an unsavory technicality
to hold that a railroad laid down by the curb in front of a man's
door, with trains constantly passing and repassing, did not
interfere with his access to his house, and was not an injury
caused by the construction of the road. No authority for
such a proposition can be found in anything this Court has
ever said. We are of opinion that in the case in hand there
was an injury arising from the erection and construction. This
being so it stands upon the same footing as to consequential
injuries as if there had been an actual taking of a portion of the
plaintiff's property."
Penna. Schuylkill Valley R. R. Co. v. Ziemer,' was an
exactly similar case, and consequential damages arising from
the construction and lawful use of the road along the highway
in front of plaintiff's premises were likewise recovered.
In Northern Central Rwy. Co. v. Holland,2 damages were
recovered for depreciation in value of plaintiff's property by
reason of the enlargement of and operation of defendant's road-
way, re-located so close to the property as to obstruct ingress
and egress thereto, fill it with smoke, cinders, offensive smells,
depriving it of facilities for light and air, etc.
1 124 Pa., 560.
2 117 Pa., 613.
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In Snyder v. City of Lancaster,' the opening of a street
necessitated the taking downof a house adjoining the plaintiff's
property, and it was held that inasmuch as the plaintiff's house
would thereby have no gable end, the openingof the street was
an injury within the intendment of the Constitution, although
no part of plaintiff's property was actually taken.
For the lawful vacation of a public highway, no damages
are recoverable by him injured in consequence. The public
have but a right of way, and upon the vacation of the road,
the owners of the soil are reinvested with absolute control
over it; each abutting property-owner having title to the
middle of the road, if not inconsistent with this grant. This
was decided in Paul v. Carver,2 where BLACK, J., said: " Sur-
rendering the right of way over a public road to the owners of
the soil, is not taking private property forpublic use, and the
proprietors of other land incidentally injured by the discon-
tinuance of the road are not entitled to compensation A
private road is private property, and an- Act of Assembly to
close it up without paying for it, would be depriving the owner
of his property. But a public road belongs to nobody but the
State; and when the Government sees proper to vacate it, the
consequential loss, if there be any, must be borne by those
who suffer it, just as they would bear what might result from
a refusal to make it in the first place." The Constitutiort of
1874 has not altered the law in this instance. The question
arose in McGee's Appeal,3 which was from a decree sustaining
a demurrer to a bill in equity for an injunction to restrain the
destructior of a bridge forining part of Washington Street, in
the city of Pittsburgh, upor which street the complainant's
property abutted. As the consequential injury arose from the
vacation of a public street by the municipal authorities, to
whose lawful acts the plaintiff was subject, and as no private
property was taken or applied to public use, but, on the con-
trary, private property was surrendered to him from whom it
had theretofore been taken by the public, relief was denied;
though had there been special legislation for an award of
12o W. N. C., 184.
224 Pa., Jo7, 211.
3 114 Pa., 470.
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damages to the owners of property injured by the vacation,
the same would be recoverable.1
Nor for the opening of a public highway bythe State can
compensation be demanded, without an express provision
therefor. The original grants from the proprietaries or the
commonwealth of Pennsylvania contained an allowance of six
per cent. for highways. Provision having thus originally been
made for the taking of land for public highways, there exists
no constitutional or other obligation for the State to make
additional .compensation for the opening of public highways
"Roads are laid out under the authority of the commonwealth,
and in the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Neither
the commonwealth, nor the township or other municipal
division through which the road passes, is liable to land-
owners for damages sustained by the exercise of the preroga-
tive of the supreme power of the State, until made so by law."3
Article XVI, Section 8, of the Constitution provides that
municipal and other corporations shall make compensation for
property taken, injured or destroyed in the construction or
enlargement of their works, highways or improvements. A
township is not such a corporation as comes within the intend-
ment of this section. Counties and boroughs, however, are
municipal corporations, and therefore liable both for land
taken and property injured by reason of the opening and
grading of streets,4 the construction of a reservoir,5 and similar
public improvements.
1 In re Vacation of Centre Street, Ix Pa., 247;" In re Howard Street 28
W. N. C. 159.
2 Towrnship of East Urnion v. Comrey, oo Pa., 362, 366; MfcClenachan v.
Curwdn, 3 Yeates, 362, 372-3.
3 Wagner v. Township of Salzburg, 132 Pa., 636, 647; per WILLIAMS, J.;
Lamoreux v. County of Luzerne, x16 id., 195, 197.
4 Wagner v. Townshipi of Salzburg, 132 Pa., 636, 647 ; Streets and Alleys
in Parkesburg Borough, 124 id., 52i, 525; Aipeal of the County of Delaware
n29 id., 159; County of Chester v. Brower, r17 id., 647, 655; Lamoreux v.
County of Luzerne, n26id., 195, 199; Coutra, Freeze v. County of Columbia,
6 W. N. C., 145; See Mfarshall v. Township of Lower Towamensing, I5 id., 235.
5 Haupt's Aippeal, 125 Pa., 21r, 223; Lord v. Meadville Water Co., 26 W.
N. C., 22O.
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Consequential damages arising from the negligent con-
struction of a railroad, are not recoverable.' "The inconve-
nience to the public caused by building a railway over a street,
or the convenience resulting from building a bridge over a
river, though diverting business from a ferry, is not an injury
to private property for which the owner of the ferry may
recover damages. A lawful construction of a railway over a
street, or of a bridge over a river, though likely to diminish
the receipts of a ferry, is not injury to private property in the
franchise of the ferry, within the intendment of the Consti-
tution."'
In Knoll v. N. Y, Chi. & St. L. R. ?. Co.,3 the plaintiff,
a mortgagee, not in possession, of certain premises was denied
damages for the alleged depreciation in value of the mortgaged
premises, by reason of the construction of defendant's railroad
in the street on which they faced, as the mortgagor in posses-
sion had bonafide made a settlement with the company and
given a release of damages; the mortgagee had made no
attempt to collect the mrortgage debt, and it was apparent that
the property in its present condition was abundant security
for the mortgage.
An action on the case is the proper remedy for the
recovery of consequential damages, under Article XVI,
Section 8, of the Constitution, in the absence of a remedy
provided by the Legislature for the assessment of such dam-
ages. A jury to assess damages can only be appointed where
property is actually taken.4
I Edmundson v. Pittsburgh, MfcKeesport and Youghiogeny R. R. Co., ixi
Pa., 3x6.
2 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. R. Co. v. .ones, ill Pa., 204, 213; per
TRUNKEY, J.
3 121 Pa., 467.
4 
Ofeyer v. Horst, io6 Pa., 552; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Duncan, rxx id., 352;
Phila. & Read. R. R. Co. v. Patent, 17 W. N. C., 198; Levering v. Phila.,
Gin. & C. H. R. R. Co., 18 id., 5o; Northern Central Rwy. Co. v. Holland,
117 Pa., 613; County of Chester v. Brower, id., 647; App Peal of the County of
Delaware, id. ; In re Plan s66, 28 W. N. C. 4o6; Kershaw v. City of Philadelpihia,
27 id. 341.
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The concluding words of the constitutional section under
consideration are, "which compensation shall be paid or
secured before such taking, injury or destruction." In
Penna. R. R. Co. vs. Mapcihant,' it was said that compensation
could only be paid or secured in advance for such injuries as
resulted from construction or enlargement. " For how can
injuries which flow only from the future operation of the road,
which may never happen, be ascertained in advance, and com-
pensation made therefor?" But in O'Brien vs. Penna. Sch.
Val. R. R. Co. 2 it was held that where no security was pro-
vided in advance recovery could be had -for consequential
injuries, likely to occur by the construction of a railroad, by
suit commenced immediately after the commencement of the
work.
Acts of Assembly vesting in corportions the right to
private property, without providing for compensation, are
unconstitutional.3 ' Until compensation is made or secured,
railroad and other corporations or individuals, invested with
the right of eminent domain, acquire no title to the land they
may take. They are trespassers, and the owner may maintain
ejectment.4 Although a street may have been located on a
plan, until it is opened and damages secured, a railroad com-
pany cannot take or occupy it in constructing its roadway,
1 19 Pa., 541, 559; per PAXSON, J. ; see Minnig v. N. Y., Chi. & St. Louis
R. R. Co., ix W. N. C., 297.
2 119 Pa., 184.
3 Fleming's Appeal, 6s Pa., 444, 449; Borough of Strasburg v. Bachman,
2r W. N. C., 462; Lebanon School Dist. v. Lebanon Female Seminary,
22 id., 65; Danville, Hazelon & Wilkesbarre R. 2?. Co. v. commonweallh,
73 Pa., 29, 36.
4 Phila. Newton & N Y. R. R. Co. v. Cooper, xo5 Pa. Oliver v. Pills.,
Va. and Ctarleston R. R. Co., 131 Pa., 408; WheelingPilts. & Balto. R. R.
Co. v. WVarrell, 122 id., 613; Gilmore v. V. & C. R. R. Co., 104 id., 275,
280; Pills. & L. E. R. R. Co. v. Bruce, 1o2 id., 23; Phillipis v. Dunkirk, Var-
ren & Pills. R?. R. Co., 78 Pa., 177; AlcClinton v. Pills. Ft. Vayne & Chi.
Rwy. Co., 66 id., 404; Levering v. Phila. Gin. & . R. R. Co., 8W. & S.,
459; Lord v. Mfeadville ater Co., 26 W. N. C., ino; C'ampbell v. Pittsburgh
61 Iestern Rwy. Co., 137 Pa. S74, 579; Richards v. Buffalo, etc. -R. R. Co.,
id, 524; Williamsport & North Branch R?. R?. Co. v. Philadelzia h & Eric
R. R. Co., 141 id., 407.
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unless compensating the owner of the land In ,Sterling's
Appeal,' it was decided that an injunction could issue restrain-
ing the laying of a pipe line without making or securing com-
pensation, as it was an injury of such a continuing and per-
manent nature, that a common law action would afford no
adequate remedy.'
Likewise, trespass is maintainable for an unlawful entry,
i. e., where compensation is not made, or a bond tendered, as
required by Act of Assembly. And recovery may be had for
damages suffered up to the time of bringing suit, or until a
bond is filed and approved by the Court. The subsequent
tender of a bond and approval of security, and the institution
of proceedings for the condemnation of the land do not divest
the right of action which accrued at the commission of the
trespass. However, should the land-owner submit his case
to a jury of view, it is a waiver of an action of trespass, even
though the jury fail to award him damages. " But compensa-
tion for the permanent injury, arising from the taking of the
land, under the power of eminent domain, is to be assessed in
the statutory proceeding; and evidence as to the effect of
such appropriation upon the market value of the property, a
part of which has been taken, is inadmissible upon the trial of
an action for the trespass of entering without previous pay-
ment or offer of security."4 A land-owner is estopped from
treating as a trespass the entry of a railroad corporation,
I Beidler's Appfeal, 23 W. N. C., 451; Quigley v. Penna. Sch. Val. R. R.
Co., 221 Pa., 35; Pills. & L. E. R. R. Co. v. Bruce, 102 id., 23; Jarden v.
P. W. & B. R. R. Co., 3 Whar., 502.
2 iri Pa., 35.
3 See also Penn Gas Coal Co. v. Versailles Fuel Gas Co., 13 Pa., 522;
Appeal of Curwensville Borough, 129 id., 74.
1 'Kil v. Chartiers Val. Gas Co., 131 Pa., 466; Bethlehem South Gas and
Water Co., v. Yoder, 332 id., 136, 142; Penna R. R. Co. v. b.y, 107 id., 166,
172 ; Gilmore v. L. V and P 2. R. Co., 304 id., 275, 280; Dimmick v.
Brodhead, 75 id., 464, 466-7; McClinton v. Pills., -Ft. Wayne and Chi. RzBy.
Co., 66 id., 404; Borough of Harrisburg v. Prangle, 3 W. & S., 46o; Lord
v. Meadville llaler Co., 26 W. N. C., 3io; WIflliamspiort & Norlh Branch
R. R. Co. v. Phila. 6 Erie 1?. R. Co., 27 id., 536; x41 Pa. 407; Graham v.
Pils. & Lake Erie R. 2. Co., 48 Leg. Int. 538. The owner of the land cannot
appropriate the property of the trespasser left thereon ; Justice v. Nesquehon-
ing Val. 2. R. Co., 87 Pa., 28.
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without payment of damages or tender of security, when he
consents to the entry and sees the expenditures of large sums
of money upon his land in the construction of an extension of
a line of railroad in actual operation. But he is not thereby
deprived of his right to compensation. He can proceed to
have the damages assessed in th: statutory manner, or he may
bring ejectment for the land, but upon his recovery ofjudgment
in the latter proceeding, execution will be stayed, upon pay-
ment of costs, to allow the corporation to condemn the land,
as of the time of its entry, in accordance with the statutory
enactment Pending proceedings for the ascertainment of
compensation, the corporation may mortgage its equitable
interest, subject to the payment of the judgment for the pur-
chase money.'
We have seen that under previous Constitutions it was
held that the power of taxation in a municipality was suffi-
cient security for property taken by it.3 Accordingly in the
Appeal of the County of Delaware,. the same rule was held
applicable under the present Constitution, and plaintiff was
refused an injunction to secure compensation for injuries
likely to be done him by the reconstruction of a bridge.
If damages are neither paid nor secured in advance, suit
may be brought for their recovery immediately after the com-
mencement of the work, and recovery had for all damages
which may be caused by the location and subsequent con-
struction of the road. The injury is complete as soon as the
work is actually undertaken at the point where the injury is
done, according to the plans and purposes of the company, as
defined by their location, grade and general scheme of con-
struction. The injury is a single one-entire and indivisible
-and damages recoverable for both the location and con-
struction of the road. Therefore, but a single action is main-
tainable, which may be brought as stated, as soon as the work
which caused the injury complained of is undertaken. But
I Oliver v. Pills., Va. and Charleston Rwy. Co., 1x Pa., 408; Graham v.
Pills. & Lake Erie R. R. Co., 48 Leg. Int. 538.
2 Borough of Easton's Appeal, 47 Pa., 255.
3 See ante, p. 467.
4 xxg Pa., 259; Bromley v. City of Philadelphia, 47 Leg. Int., 3z8.
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the mere fact that the railroad company had driven stakes
along the middle of the proposed route, and has formally
adopted the same, and has obtained the assent of the city
authorities thereto, vests no right to damages prior to the
actual. commencement of the construction of the track.' And
where the owner of property injured died after the commence-
ment of the work, but before its completion, suit was properly
brought by his executrix, as the right of action accrued dur-
ing testator's lifetime.' Proceedings must be instituted, it
would seem, within six years of the "actual, physical com-
pletion of the work."3  The Act of May 24, 1878 does not
authorize the recovery of damages for injuries resulting from
the change of grade of a street prior to the adoption of the
present Constitution.'
A claim for consequential damages is a continuing lien
upon the corporate franchises of the company exercising the
right of eminent domain, and proceedings already commenced
can be continued against the sheriff's vendeeY
Compensation is the consideration or price of a privilege
purchased. It is usually called damages It need not consist
in money; it may be awarded in particular benefits which the
land owner receives; but benefits in which he shares equally
with all others are notjust compensation.
7
'See Apieal of N. B. andN. C R. R. Co., io5 Pa., 13 ;PhilaandGray's
Ferry Pass. Rwy. Co.'s Aipeal, 102 id., 123; Williamsporl & North Branch
R. R. Co. v. .Phla. & Erie R. R. Co., 141 id., 407. See, also, Jones v. Erie
& Wyoitni Valley R. R. Co., 29 W. N. C. 167.
2
O'Brien v. Penna. Sch. Val. R. R. Co., xi9 Pa., 184; Penna. Sch. Val.
R. R. Co. v. Ziemer, 124 id., 56o.
3 
Brower v. City of Philadellhia, 26 W. N. C., 270, 272 ; 28 id. 87; 142
Pa. 350; Landes v. Borough of Norristown, 21 W. N. C., 212: Ian-
uum v. Borough of IVest Chester, 63 Pa., 475, Volkmor St., 124 id., 320; In
rePlan z66, 28 IV. N. C. 4o6. 409; Ogden v. City of Philadelha, id. 413, 415.
4 Folkinson v. Boro. of Easton, rx6 Pa., 623.
5 Lycoming Gas and Water Co. v. Mt'oyer, 99 Pa., 615 ; Potter v. Polts.
Rwy. Co., 17 W. N. C., 40.
6 Gilmore v. Pills., Va. & Ch. R. R. b., 1o4 Pa. 275, 281 ; Buf., X I. &
Phila. R. R. Co. v. Harvey, 107 id. 319; Long v. Harrisburg & Potomac R.
R. Co., 126 id. 143.
7 Susanna Root's Case, 77 Pa. 276; Opening of Walnut St., 28 W. N. C.
51; In re Howard St., id. 159; In re Markel St., 42 Leg. Int. 15.
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Compensation inheres in the land-it is an estate; and
although a railroad company had executed a mortgage upon
its property and franchises before taking a person's land and
the rendition of a judgment for damages, which the company
had failed to pay or secure, a sale under that mortgage will
not divest the interest of the plaintiff, and he can recover from
the vendee the amount of his judgment, viz., the price of the
land.'
The right to compensation does not rest in contract, ex-
press or implied, but solely on an act of appropriation under
the power of eminent domain delegated by the State. No
consent is necessary to complete the appropriation, which is
practically a seizure; and as postponement of payment is in
derogation of the citizen's constitutional right, a corporation
taking private property is not entitled to a stay of execution
under the provisions of the Act of June 16, 1836.2
The right to compensation is a personal claim of the land
owner at the time of the appropriation of his land or of -an
injury thereto? The damages do not run with the land, nor
pass by a conveyance thereof, although not specially reserved
in the deed.' In the case of a change of grade of a street,
the claim matures when the grade is confirmed; if the land is
sold before the grading is actually done, the purchaser can
claim no damages Or if the owner leases land appropriated
by a railroad company before a bond is filed or the construc-
tion of the road, the right to damages does not pass
He who claims compensation must first prove his title to
the land. The defendant can, of course, show that the
premises, or a part thereof, did not belong to the plaintiff7 In
I Bief., X. i. &" Phila. R. R. Co. v. Harvey, io7 Pa. 319.
2 Harrisbutg (V Potomac R. R. Co. v. Peffer, 84 Pa. 295.
3 Tenbrooke v. Jahke, 77 Pa. 392.
4 Losch's Appeal, io9 Pa. 72.
5 Campbell v. City of Philadelphia, xo8 Pa. 300; Borough of iew Brighton
v. Piersol, 107 id. 280.
6 Davis v. Titusville & Oil City' Rwy. Co., 114 Pa. 308; WVarrell v. W. R.
& B. R. R. Co., 13o Pa. 6oo, 6og-io, Jteeling, R. & B. R. R. Co., v. Warrell,
122 id. 613.
Phila. & Read. R. R. 6o. v. Oberl, 1o9 Pa. 193; Penna. Sch. Val. R. R.
Co. vs. Keller, 20 W. N. C., 125.
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Pena. Sciuylkill Palley R. R. Co. v. Cleary, an administrator
had bought his decedent's land at Sheriff's sale, under a judg-
ment obtained by him in decedent's lifetime. Before the exe-
cution of the deed, but after the sale, a railroad company ap-
propriated the land, and it was held that the administrator had
title sufficient to maintain an action for damages.
If a railroad company gives a bond to a land-owner to
cover damages to be assessed for the taking of his land, or
injury to it, the title of the land-owner is gone, and his remedy
is on the bond.2 The land-owner may agree to convey a right
of way over his land to a railroad company, and he thereby
prevents a recovery of any damages he may sustain and f6r
which he otherwise would be entitled to claim compensation;
the release, if for a valid consideration, is also binding upon
his lessees and others claiming under him? If the land-owner
accepts damages awarded him by the viewers, he is estopped
from proceeding by injunction to prevent special injury to his
property.4 It is presumed that the jury included in the award
everything that was a legitimate subject of compensation,-
though they did not itemize the damages, as they could have
been requested to do.6
The owner of land may lose his right to compensation by
a dedication to public use. The dedication may be implied,
as where a person divides his land into building lots and opens
avenues for the purpose of selling the sites in accordance with
this plan; in such case, he makes the streets public highways.
But the grantor of land is not deprived of his right to
I r25 Pa. 442.
2 Fries v. So. Pa. R. R. & irin. Co., 85 Pa. 73 ; Hoffmnan's Appieal, 118
id. 512; Penna. Nal. Gas Co. v. Cook, 123 id. 170; Wallace v. New Caslle,
etc. R. R. Co., z38 id. i68.
3 Updegroz'e v. Penna. Sch. Val. R. R. Co., 132 Pa. 540; Oliver v. P., V.
and C. Ruy. Co., W3r id. 408; Hoffeditz v. So. Pa. Rwy. ( Min. Co., z29 id.
264; N. & IV. Br. Ruy. Co. v. Swank, io5 id. 555; Crowallain v. City of
Philadelikhia, 17 W. N. C. 261 ; Jones v. Penna. R. R. Co. 28 W. N. C. 375
Hoffman v. Bloomsburg &. Sullian R. R. Co., id. 361 ; Richards v. Buffalo,
etc., R. R. CO-, 137 Pa. 524.
4 Campbell's Appeal, 22 W. N. C. 8r.
5 Tucker v. Erie & A. E. R. R. Co., 27 Pa. 281.
6 Harve, v. Lackawanna & Bloomsbur, R. R. Co., 47 Pa. 428; D., L. &'
W. R. R. Co. v. Burson, 61 id. 369.
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compensation for land taken for a public street, by reason of
the fact that in the deed the street is mentioned as a boundary,
whereas, in fact, the street has only been laid out upon the
city plan and remains unopened; when the street is actually
opened, the grantor can claim compensation.' Dedication to
public use depends upon the land-owner's intention. Long
continued use by the public is not conclusive evidence of such
an intent; it is always open to explanation. If the user has
been adverse and exclusive for a period of twenty-one years,
the title of the owner is divested, and he is deprived of com-
pensation'
The vendee of land upon which a street has been plotted
and the plan for its opening confirmed, cannot, upon its actual
opening, recover damages from the vendor upon a covenant
implied in the words "grant, bargain and sell," or on a cove-
nant of general warranty. "An entry on land by authority of
the State, in the exercise of its right of eminent domain, is not
a breach of such a covenant. While the public may enjoy it
as an easement, in law, unless otherwise directed by the stat-
ute, the fee still remains in the owner. Hence a covenant of
warranty 'against the grantor and his heirs, and against all
and every other person or persons lawfully claiming or to
claim,' was held in Dobbins v. Brown, 2 Jones, 75, not to be
broken by the entry and occupancy of the Commonwealth in
the exercise of its right of eminent domain. Such entry is
without the consent of the owner. It is an inherent right in
the Commonwealth, and its exercise cannot be prevented by
the owner. His remedy is compensation provided by the
State. An action on the covenant will not lie against the
vendor."3  An entry on land, under the right of eminent do-
main, incurs no breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment; it
is not an eviction. " The tenants are such owners as are en-
titled to compensation from the State or her grantee, and must
1 In re Oiening qf Brookh'n Street, n8 Pa. 640; In re Opiening of
Ui,',,e Avenue, 124 id., 135.
IVeiss v. Borough qf South Bethlehem, 26 W. N. C., 433; 136 Pa.
294; (;riffith's Appeal, 1o9 Pa., 16o; Comnonowealth v. P. (2. R. R. R. Co.,
135 id. 256.
Ake v. -7fason, iox Pa., 17, 20; per MERCUR, J.
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look to that quarter for redress for any injury they may have
suffered."'
Where the whole of a tract of land is taken by virtue of
the exercise of the right of eminent domain, fair compensa-
tion is its market value; where but a portion is taken, and
applidd to'a public use, the remainder may be benefited, even
to an extent beyond the value of the land taken. A familiar
instance is the case of opening streets through a man's prop-
erty, where the powers of eminent domain and taxation move
hand in hand. Eminent domain takes what is wanted, and
by virtue of the power of taxation the individual is assessed
benefits accruing to his remaining property by reason of the
opening of the highway.' This leads us to consider-
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
For the taking of land by virtue of the right of eminent
domain we consider.
First, the measure of damages where the whole tract is
taken; and,
Secondly, where only a part is appropriated.
(r.) WIhere the whole is taken.
The owner is entitled to the market value of his property,
or what it would bring at a public or private sale, fairly con-
ducted. How is the market value to be estimated? In
THtsburgh, Virginia and Charleston Railway Company v.
Vance,3 CLARK, J., says: "The market value of land is not
necessarily, as would sometimes seem to be supposed, the
price which it would command in a forced sale by public
auction; it is estimated upon a fair consideration of the
location of the land, the extent and condition of its improve-
I Dyer v. liightman, 66 Pa., 425, 427; per SHARSWOOD, J.; Schuylkill "
Daupihin .nip. & R. R. Co. v. Schmoele, 57 id., 27!.
2 Pennock v. Hoover, 5 Rawle, 291 ; A&eMaslers v. Commonwealth, 3
Watts, 292; City of Philadelphia v. Ilatis, 35 Pa., 427 ; Commonwealth v.
Walts, 44 id., r313; Hammet v. Philadelphia, 64 id., 156
2 X25 Pa., 325, 331.
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ments, its quantity and productive qualities, and the uses to
which it may reasonably be applied, taken with the general
selling price of lands in the neighborhood at the time. The
price which, upon full consideration of the matters stated,
the judgment of well-informed and reasonable men will
approve, may be regarded as the market value. The general
selling price of lands in the neighborhood cannot be shown
by evidence of particular sales of alleged similar properties;
it is a price fixed in the mind of the witness from a knowl-
edge of what lands are generally held at for sale, and at
which they are sometimes actually sold, bona fide, in the
neighborhood."'
(2). Wh/ere apart of the tract is taken.
The true measure of damages is the difference between
the market value of the property unaffected by the obstruc-
tion, and its market value afterward. The rule was formu-
lated by GIBSON, J., in Schuylkill Navigation Company v.
Thoburn," where he said: "The jury are to consider the
matter just as if they were called on to value the injury
at the moment when compensation could first be demanded;
they are to value the injury to the property, without reference
to the person of the owner, or the actual state of his business;
and in doing that, the only safe rule is to inquire what
would the property, unaffected by the obstruction, have sold
for, at the time the injury was committed? What would it
have sold for, as affected by the injury? The difference is
the true measure of compensation." In the adjustment of
this difference, a fair and just comparison must be made of
the advantages and disadvantages necessarily resulting from
the construction and operation of the road; and only the
advantages which are special, and disadvantages as are
actual to the particular property, are to be considered.
Among the advantages resulting from the building of the
road may be considered the general appreciation of proper-
ties in the neighborhood; but unless the particular property
I Pills. & WVestern R. R. Co. v. Patterson, 107 Pa., 46!; Curlin v. Nittany
Valley R. R. Co., 26 W. N. C., 16x, 166; 135 Pa. 20; Il'hilaker v. Borough of
Phienixville, 141 id. 327.
27 S. & R., 411, 422-3.
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through which the road runs has advanced in market value
beyond that of other properties in the neighborhood, this
element of advantage must not be taken into account, as
each individual is entitled to share in the general increase of
values, as a public benefit. The disadvantages must be
actual ones, and not speculative; they must substantially
affect the present market value of the land.' "The advan-
tages and disadvantages are to be estimated upon the farm or
tract as a whole, and not upon each separate field as though
it was a separate property. An advantage accruing to one
farm or tract by reason of the construction of the railroad
near or through it cannot be set off against an injury sus-
tained by another piece of property belonging to the same
owner. Nor can the owner of a farm or tract, part of which
is benefited and another part of which is injured, divide his
property arbitrarily so as to exclude from the consideration
of the jury the advantages he secures in one place, while
recovering for the disadvantages suffered in another."
2
What are the qualifications one must possess to testify as
to market value ? The question is not one of science or skill,
upon which only an expert can give an opinion. Persons liv-
ing in the neighborhood are presumed to have sufficient
knowledge of the market value of the property.2  In Pitts-
burgh, Virginia & Charleston Railway Co. v. Vance, CLARK,4
J., said: "The estimate which a witness may make, it is true,
' Pittsburgh, Bradford 6' Buffalo Rzvy. Co. v. 3cCloskey, 'to Pa., 436,
442, 443; Watson v. Pittsburgh & Connellswzlle R. R. Co. 37 id., 469; East
Penna. R. R. Co. v. Hottensline, 47 id., 28; Harvey v. Lackawanna &
Bloomsburg R. R. Co., id., 428; Hornstein v. Atlantic d' G1 eat Vestern R.
R. Co., 51 id., 87; Shienango & Allegheny R. R. Co. v. Bralam, 79 id., 447;
Long v. Harrisburg & Potomac R. R. Co., 126 id., 143; Penna. Canal Con-
fiany v. Hill, 6 W. N. C., 182.
2 Ballo. & Phila. R. R. Co v. Springer, 21 W. N. C., x43, 144; per
VILLIA.2IS, J.; Ha rrisburg & Potomac R. R. Co. v. M17oore, 4 id., 532; Balto.
& Phila. R. R. Co. v. Sloan, 131 Pa., 568 ; Gorgas v. P., 1. (:' P. R. R. Co.,
28 W. N. C, 436; Harris v. Sch. River E. S. R. R. Co.. 141 Pa. 242; Cham-
bers v. Borough of South Chester, 140 id., 51o; Geissinger v. Hellerlou'n
Boro., 133 id., 522; Graham v. P. c&. L. E. R. R. Co., 48 Leg. Int., 538;
Risher v. Baden Gas Co., 138 Pa. 301.
3Penna, &NV .Y. R. R. de Canal Co. v. Biunnell, 8 Pa., 414, 426.
4115 Pa., 325, 332.
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is in some sense an opinion, but it is an opinion formed from
actual personal knowledge of facts affecting the subject matter
of inquiry, and, as a conclusion of fact, is admissible in evi-
dence, from necessity, as the best evidence of which such a
question is ordinarily susceptible. In order, therefore, that a
witness may be competent to testify intelligently as to the
market value of land, he should have some special opportu-
nity for observation; he should, in a general way, and to a
reasonable extent, have in his mind the data from which a
proper estimate of value ought to be made; if interrogated,
he should be able to disclose sufficient actual knowledge of
the subject to indicate that he is in condition to know what he
proposes to state, and to enable the jury to judge of the prob-
able proximate accuracy of his conclusions. He may hesi-
tate in making an estimate of the value; he may say that he
does not know certainly, but after due deliberation may be
able to express an opinion, or come to a conclusion, the accu-
racy of which, under all the evidence, is, of course, wholly for
the jury." "Though the knowledge of a witness of the value
of lands in the neighborhood may have rested solely upon a
few purchases made by the railroad company, and from no
other sales or purchases in the real estate market, he has some
knowledge upon which to base an opinion, and the value of
that opinion is for the jury."' But his estimate must cover
the whole property, and not only that part with which he was
acquainted,2 even though lie should state that the part omitted
from his valuation was not affected.' Viewers are competent
to testify, on an appeal from their award, if restricted to facts
'Pitlsbur¢- & Lake Erie R. R. Co. v. Robinson, 95 Pa., 426, 432; Curtin
v. 2%illany I-alley R. R. Co., 26W. N. C., 161; Kellogg v. AXrauser, 14 S. &
R., 137 , 142; Bro'n v. Corey & Peterson, 43 Pa., 495, 5o6; Penna. R. R.
Co., v. tfenderson, 51 id.. 315, 32r. hite Deer Creek Inp. Co. v. Sassamawi,
67 Pa., 415 ; Pit/s., l'a. & Charles/on R. R. Co. v. Rose, 74 id., 362, 368;
Hinkle's Estate, 20 W. N. C., 351 ; Pills. S. R. R. Co. v. Reed, 44 Leg. Int.,
92. yers v. Sch. Ri,. East Side R. R. Co., 45 id., 236, 5 Pa. C. C. Rep., 634;
Sch. Ri,. East Side R. R. Co., v. Rees, 26W. N. C., 500; 135 Pa. 629 ; Gorgas
v. P., H. & P. R. R. Co., 28 W. N. C., 436; Galtaher v. Aemmerer, 29 id.,
87; SMith v. Penna. S. l'. R. R. Co., 14i Pa. 68; See Penna & N. Y Canal
R. R. Co. v. JMadell, XV. N. C., 286.
"Pills. I a., & Charles/on Railwar Go. v. I ance, 115 Pa., 325.
S'/khivkill River East Side R. R. Co. v. Stocker, 128 Pa., 233.
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within their personal knowledge.' So may the jury be per-
mitted to view the premises; their " own observation is just
as good as that of any of the witnesses; and whilst they are
not to disregard the testimony produced on the trial, they are,
nevertheless, not required to repudiate the evidence of their
own senses."
2
The elements of damage are numerous and vary with
each case. It may be said generally that" whatever injurious-
ly affects property, as the direct and necessary result of the
location of the road upon it, may be considered in the assess-
ment of damages ;" any facts tending to enlighten the jury
and enable them to correctly judge of the value of the proper-
ty taken, are admisqible in evidence.' But " merely specula-
tive damages cannot be allowed.. The inconvenience, arising
from a division of property or from increased difficulty of
access, the burden of increased fencing, the ordinary danger
from accidental fires to the fences, fields or farm buildings, not
resulting from negligence, and generally all such matters as,
owing to the particular location of the road, may affect the
convenient use and future enjoyment of the property are
proper matters for consideration; but they are to be considered
in comparison with the advantages, only as they affect the
market-value of the land."4
Thus it is error to instruct the jury that they cannot con-
sider, in determining damages, any possible loss that might
I Harrisburg & Polomnac R. R. Co. v. Stayrnan, 2 W. N. C., 1o3; Der-
lan v. East Brandywine & Mzynesburg R. R. Co., 43 Pa., 520, 526.
2 Traut v. .. Y', Chicago and St. Louis R. Rwy; Co., 22 W. N. C., 540;
Harman v. Penna, Schuylkill Valley R. R. Co., id., 84; Flower v. Ballo. &
Plula. R. R. Co., 132 Pa., 524; Hoffnan v. Bloomsburg & Sullivan R. R. Co,
28 W. N. C., 36r; Gorgas v. P., H. & P. R. R. Co., id., 336.
3 Schuylkill River East Side R. R. Co. v. Kersey, 25 W. N. C. 455; 133
Pa. 234; Penna. Sch. Valley R. R. Co. v. Keller, 20 id., 125; 3cTerren v.
Mont Alto R. R. Co. 2 id. 40; East Brandywine & Waynesburg R. R. Co. v.
Rauck, I id. 6o8 (where it was held that defendant could offer evidence ofplain-
tiff's declaration as to the value of his land and the price obtained for certain
portions previously sold by him); Danville H. d2 IV. R. R. Co. v. .17cKelvey,
id. 338; Penna. & N. XY. Canal & R. R. Co. v. 11adell, id. 287; Danville,
Hazleton .f Wilkesbarre R. R. Co. v. Gearhart, id. 237; 32 P. F. Smith, 26o.
4Pitsburgh, Bradford & Buffalo Railway Co. v. c(7oske, iro Pa. 436,
442. 443 ; per CLARK, J.
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occur by fire or other cause in the management of a railroad.
The risk of fire is clearly an element of depreciation; but its
effect on the market value is but a consideration in estimating
the damages, and not an exclusive item.' Likewise, the cost
of fencing cannot be recovered as a distinct item of dam-
ages, though the jury may consider how much the burden of
fencing will detract from the value of the land.2 So evidence
of a loss of the custom of a mill, in consequence of a location
of a railroad in front of it, is admissible, not as a distinct or
legitimate item of damages, but as affecting the market-value?
But the jury cannot consider any supposed loss of profits,4
though the fact that the premises were more difficult to rent
is an element which may be considered in determining the
difference in value.5
In the case last cited it was held that where, by reason
of the widening of a street an owner of property in making
alterations thereto is obliged to recede from the old building-
line and build in a recess between two unaltered adjacent
houses, the inconvenience to occupants of the premises so
reconstructed, and the cnnsequent difficulty of procuring
tenants, are proper elements of damage; and the possibility
that the adjoining buildings would, at some future time, be
set back, was also to be considered as an element in deter-
mining the value of the property before and after the widen-
ing of the street.
I Seizler v. Penna. Sch. Valley R. R. Co., I r Pa. 56; Gilmore v. P., V. CY
C. R. R. Co., 104 id 275,; Wilininglon & Reading R. R. Co. v. Stauffer, 60
Pa. 374; Hoffm
t
an v. Bloomsbttr " & Stllizan R. R. Co. 28 V. N. C., 361.
2Lirtin v. Nil/any Val. R. R. Co., 26W. N. C. 161; 135 Pa. 2o; Pittsbitrgh,
Bradford & B u~ffalo Rzu'y. Co. v. IlCloskei', IIo Pa. 436; Penna. & JV Y '
Canal & R. R. Co. v. Bunnell. 8i id. 414; D., L. 6 IV. R. R. Co. v. Burson,
61 id. 369; Watson v. Pillsbnrgh &2
" 
Connellsville R. R. Co.6, 37 id. 469;
Plank-Road Co. v. Ramage, 20 id. 95; ,Monlotr"R. R. Co. v. Scott, ii W. N.
C. 51.
3 Pitlsburgh, I-rginia & Charleston Ricy. Co. v. Vance, i15 Pa. 325
W'estern Penna. R. R. Co. v. Hill, 56 id. 460.
4
Pills. & 11est. R. R. Co. v. Patterson, 107 Pa. 461 ; Penna. R. R. Co. v.
Ebir, id. x66 ; In re Widening of Chestnut Street, 20 W. N. C. 77.
5 Pittsbu,-gh, Ili. & Charleston R. R. Co. v. Rose, 74 Pa. 362; Li/" of
Philadel5hia v. Linnard, 67 id. 242 ; Keiser v. .lahlanoir City Gas C., 28 W.
N. C. 169.
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In the case of opening a street, the possibility that other
streets may at some time be opened through or near the
plaintiff's property, which, when opened, will render it more
valuable for building lots, is not to be considered as an
advantage. But where the opening of a particular street
enables the owner of property through which it passes to lay
out other streets on his own land, thereby increasing his
available frontage and the market value of his property as a
whole, this circumstance may be considered by the jury in
assessing him benefits.' In the Newville Road Case2 it was
said that in estimating damages for the opening of a public
road, the fact that it would revert, upon its vacation (a possi-
ble, though uncertain event) to its former proprietors, is to be
considered. But this is go only where the State has imposed
a servitude on the land, by devoting it to public use as a
highway, and not where the commonwealth acquires a fee
simple: for, in the latter event, the land would not revert on
a cessation of its use as a public highway.
3
The value of unopened mines or quarries beneath the
surface cannot be considered, though the value of the land as
mining-land is recoverable.' The construction of a railroad
through mining-lands may increase the value of the land to
I Cij, of.-llegheniy v. Black's Heirs, 99 Pa. 152.
2 8 lVatts, 172, 177.
3 Haldeman v. 'enna. Cent. R. R., So Pa. 425; Craig v. Maror of
Allegheny, 53 id. 477; Penna & X I . Canal R. R. Co. v. Billings, 94 id.,
40, 44; Penna. Canal Co. v. Harris, xoi id. 8o, 92. Where a corporation
acquires but an easement, on a cessation of the use, the land reverts to him
from whom it was originally taken: Jessup v. Loucks, 55 Pa. 359, 361 ; and
cannot again be taken by virtue of the right of eminent domain without com-
pensation any more than any other property; Pills. c& Lake Erie R. R. Co.
v. Bruce, 102 Pa. 23 ; PiVllifs v. D. T. & P. R. R. Co., 78 id. 177. In J71iff/in
v. R. R. Co., 16 Pa. 182, a turnpike company took an individual's land, making
him full compensation. An Act of Assembly subsequently authorized the sale
of the road to a railroad company, which was made liable for consequential
injuries. It was held that the settlement with the turnpike company did not
estop the plaintiff from recovering damages consequent upon the construction
of the railroad.
4 Searle v. Lackawanna & Bloomsburg R. R. Co., 33 Pa. 57; Reading c"
Pottsville R. R. Co. v. Balthaser, 126 Pa. x ; x9 id. 472. See Penn Gas Coal
Co. v. Versailles Fuel Gas Co., 131 id. 522, 532. As to effect of release of
right of surface support by a pipe line company, see .7cGr<gor v. Equitable
Gas Co., 139 Pa. 230; Davis v. Jefferswn Gas Co., 29 W. N. C. x65.
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an amount exceeding the damages' and evidence thereof, and
that better means of transportation were afforded mining
proprietors generally, is admissible as elements for the con-
sideration of the jury; but evidence of a reduction in rates of
transportation, or as to where the product of the mines or
quarries was sold, and how it' was shipped there, is
inadmissible.2
In Penna. Schuylkill Valley R. R. Co. v. Cleary, it was
held improper to introduce evidence to show into how many
building lots the land taken could be divided, their separate
values, and the probability of their sale; as well as evidence
of the fact that the owner dedlined to lease or sell the land.
The possible uses of the ground may be considered; evidence
of improvements in the neighborhood is admissible, if not too
remote; and the fact that city streets are plotted on the land,
and might some day be opened, are proper for the jury's con-
sideration.4 In Finn v. Providence Gas and Water Company,'
it was held error to instruct the jury, in an action for the
recovery of damages for the taking of lands and springs for
the construction of a reservoir, that they could award as
damages to the house erected on the land taken what it was
fairly worth to remove the same to some convenient place
outside the land covered by the reservoir, including the cost
of putting it in as good order as before.
In Schuylkill River East Side R. B. Co. v. Kersey,6 the
plaintiff, as lessee of a coal wharf and yard, was properly
allowed to prove that certain appliances necessary to the con-
duct of his business were rendered useless by the entry of the
railroad, and had to be reconstructed at an elevation, thereby
increasing the cost of raising and storing the coal, and the
breakage and waste in handling it; not as specific items of
claim, however, but as affecting market value.
I Mc Terren v. Mont. Alto R. R. Co., 2 W. N. C., 40; Plank Road Co. v.
Rea., 20 Pa. 97; Susanna Root's Case, 77 id. 276.
2 Reading Y Pottsville R. R. Co. v. Balthasar, 126 Pa. I ; ixg id. 472.
3 125 Pa., 442.
4 Schuylkill River East Side R. R. Co. v. Stocker, T28 Pa., 233.
5 99 Pa., 631.
6 25W. N. C., 455; 133 Pa- 234.
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In Schuylkill River East Side R. R. Co. v. Rees,1 evidence
was properly admitted to show added inconveniences in the
use of property which the railroad company reconstructed in
place of that appropriated by reason of the construction of the
road through the premises.
In Penna. Schylkill Valley R. R. Co. v. Keller,2 evidence
offered by defendant to show at the time of the appropriation
of plaintiff's ice plant the polluted condition of a stream which
flowed into a pond from which plaintiff obtained ice, and
through which the road was constructed, was improperly
rejected.
In Potts v. Penna. Schuylkill Valley R. R. Co.,' the plaintiffs
as partners in the marble business, operated a quarry in Mont-
gomery County, used a lot at Spring Mill, about a mile distant,
for the storage of marble and loading it on cars for transpor-
tation to their salesyard in Philadelphia. By reason of the
location of defendant's road on the Spring Mill lot they con-
tended their business was ruined, that the three properties
were used as one, and claimed damages for the depreciation
in value of the whole plant. But it was held that damages
were only recoverable for injuries to the Spring Mill lot,
CLARK, J., saying: "The general rule undoubtedly is that
disconnected properties are to be treated as distinct properties,
and damages for right of way will ordinarily be assessed on
this principle. * * * Peculiar and isolated cases may
perhaps exist where, although the lands are not in fact contig-
uous, yet the uses to which they are applied, respectively, are
in their nature so intimate and dependent, one upon the other,
that an injury to one must necessarily be taken as an injury
to the whole taken together *, * * But we do not regard
this case as coming within the general exception stated. * *
In order that two properties, having no physical connection,
may be regarded as one, in the assessment of damages for
right of way, they must be so inseparably connected in the use
47 Leg. Int., 416; 26 W. N. C., 500; 135 Pa. 629.
2 20 W. N. C., 125.
3 zi 9 Pa., 278.
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to which they are applied, as that the injury or destruction of
one must necessarily and permanently injure the other."
We have seen that by locating its line thereon a railroad
company secures a right to enter upon and occupy a citizen's
land, though payment of damages or security therefor must
precede an actual entry. Until actual entry, however, the
owner may occupy and cultivate the land, and for the destruc-
tion of crops, planted after the location but before notice or
bond given by the company, compensation must be made. A
lessee of the land, taking it with notice of the location of the
railroad, has the same right to cultivate the land and recover
damages done to his growing crops-a liability which the
company cannot discharge by payment to his landlord-
though he cannot recover for the diminution of the value of
his term.1
A life estate .in land is an independent interest, and the
life tenant is entitled, as well as the remainderman, to security
and damages for injuries resulting from the exercise of the
right of eminent domain by those empowered therewith. The
life tenant and remainderman may join in a suit, the former
being entitled to receive damages proportionate to the value
of his estate, which may be determined by multiplying the
net annual value of the premises by the years of the life
tenant's expectancy of life, and reduced to a present cash value.2
A tenant for years is likewise the owner of an estate in
the land, and may recover damages to his interest; or his
landlord may unite with him in a proceeding to recover dam-
ages for property taken and injured by a corporation acting
under its delegated right of eminent domain, but the jury
should designate the damages to which each is entitled. The
tenant can prove the value of his leasehold over the rent paid
therefor, and the jury may consider his special injuries, as the
I Lafferty v. Schuylkill River East Side R. R. Co., 124 Pa., 297; Gilmore
v. 1I. V & C. R. R. Co., 104 id. 275; Robb v. Carnegie Bros. &" Co., Limited.
28 W. N. C. 339.
2Pitts., I d. & Charleston Rwy. Co. v. Bentley, 88 Pa., 178; Borough of
Harrisburg v. Cragle, 3 W. &. S., 46o; Railroad v. Boyer, 13 Pa., 467; No.
Plenna. R. R. Co. v. Davis & Leeds, 26 id., 238; Heise &'[fflin v. Penna. R.
R. (b., 62 id., 67; McIntire v Westmoreland Coal Co., x8 id., io8.
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time required in moving and the expenses of such removal,
and losses directly resulting from defendant's act; but not for
future profits, nor for mental suffering because he would
rather have remained. The jury may consider the difference
in value of the machinery in connection with the business
conducted on the property, and its value to be removed and
applied to the same or another use.1
Where the owners of property sue for damages, and it
appears that there is an outstanding lease by them of the
property, the jury may award them damages, making allow-
ance for the value of the leasehold interest, for injury to
which the tenants alone can recover.2
In Pittsburgz & Lake Erie R. R. Co. v. Jones,3 the plain-
tiff was the owner of a ferry and held a leasehold in the
landing thereof and the defendant in constructing its road
materially interfered with the landing of boats. It was
held that defendant was liable for the depreciation of the
value of the leasehold, but not of the franchise.
In proceedings instituted to open a turnpike road to the
public, the market value of the stock of the turnpike com-
pany, and the actual productiveness of the road, are not
proper elements of damage.' But where a county takes a
private bridge, which may be said to have no general market
value, damages are based upon the value of the franchise to
the bridge company; which depends upon its productiveness
at the time of taking. In this instance the general rule is
relaxed, and evidence of past profits is admissible in assess-
ing the damages.' If property taken by a corporation in the
exercise of the right of eminent domain has been deteriorated
in value by reason of the exercise of the right by another
I Getz v. Philadelhia & Reading R. R. Co., 105 Pa. 547; Penna. R. R.
Co. v. Eby, 107 id., x66, x73; Philadelphia &? Reading R. R. Co. v. Getz, 113
id 2r4.
2 Penna. Schuylkill Valley R. R. Co. v. Ziemer, 124 Pa. 56o.
iii Pa. 204.
In re Kensington & Oxford Turnpjfike Co., 97 Pa. 26o.
5 Montgomery County v. Schuylkill Bridge Co., izo Pa. 54; Mffifflin
Bridge Co. v. County of Juniata, 29 XV. N. C. 399.
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corporation, the damages must relate to the existing de-
terioration.1
Interest may be taken into consideration by the jury in
assessing damages for land taken by virtue of the right of
eminent domain, in view of all the circumstances of the case,
in fixing a gross sum. "It is never interest as such, nor as a
matter of right, but compensation for the delay, of which the
rate of interest affords the fair legal measure." " If it is
included in the verdict, it is simply as one element of the
damages sustained by the plaintiff and liquidated by the
verdict."' In Weiss v. Borough of Soutlh Bethlehem,3 GREEN,
J., says: "We have so often held that interest may be
allowed from the time of the taking of land for public use,
b, way of damages, and that even a positive direction to
allow interest is not error, that we cannot consider it an
open question now. In Railroad v. Burson, 61 Pa., 369, we
said: 'Nor was there error in charging the jury to allow
interest. If the plaintiff was entitled to compensation by
reason of her property being taken at a particular time she
was certainly entitled to interest as a compensation for its
wrongful detention.' See also City of Allegheney v. Campbell,
107 Pa., 530."
If a railroad company enters upon property without right,
it is liable for punitive damages. But, if the jury are satisfied
the entry was made in good faith, the corporation believing it
had the right to enter, such damages should not be imposed
A corporation entering land by virtue of its tight of eminent
domain, 'is not liable, under the Act of March 29, 1824,
I Lycoming Gas & Water Co. v. Mloyer, 99 Pa. 615.
2 Richards v. Citizens Nat. Gas Co., 33o Pa. 37, 40; Reading & Pittsville
R. R. Co. v. Balthaser, 126 id. i; 2-ownshi) of Plmouth v. Grover, 125 id. 24,
37; Penina. Sch. Val. R. R. Co. v. Ziemer, i4 id. 56o; Getz v. Pldla. & Read-
ing .R. R. Co., io5 id. 547; Davidson v. Penn. R. R. Co., 15 W. N. C. 312.
3 26 W. N. C. 433, 436; 136 Pa. 294.
4 Keil v. Charliers Malley Gas Co., 131 Pa., 466; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Eby,
io7 id. 166; P. C. N Y. Rwy. Co. v. Scully, 16 W. N. C. 213.
